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NOTES 
Program Environmental Impact Statements: Review and 
Remedies 
"[R]ecognizing the profound impact of man's activity on the in-
terrelations of all components of the natural environment,"1 the Con-
gress enacted the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 
(NEPA).2 This Act declared that it was the policy of the federal 
government "to create and maintain conditions under which man and 
nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, eco-
nomic, and other requirements of present and future generations of 
Americans."3 To carry out this environmental policy, NEPA di-
rected all federal agencies to prepare a detailed statement on the 
environmental effects of all "major Federal actions significantly af-
fecting the quality of the human environment. "4 Early litigation fo-
cused only on whether particular individual actions were within the 
scope of NEPA 5 and thereby required so-called site-specific state-
1. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 
(1970). 
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970), as amended by 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(2)(D)-(l) 
(Supp. 1976). 
3. NEPA § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970). 
4. NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970). Section 4332 pro-
vides: 
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (1) 
the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted 
and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this chapter, and 
(2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall-
(c) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation 
and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human 
· environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, 
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should 
the proposal be implemented, 
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action, 
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environ-
ment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and 
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which 
would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. 
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall 
consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdic-
tion by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact in-
volved. Copies of such statement and the comments and views of the appropri-
ate Federal, State, and local agencies, which are authorized to develop and en-
force environmental standards, shall be made available to the President, the 
Council on Environmental Quality and to the public • • • . 
S. See, e.g., Monroe County Conservation Council, Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693 
107 
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ments. More recent cases, however, have determined that NEPA 
also applies to broad federal programs that encompass a number of 
individual component projects, 6 although the full extent of that appli-
cation remains unclear. 
This Note discusses the application of NEPA to federal pro-
grams. It first analyzes when the ~ourts have required a program 
impact statement and draws upon that analysis to explain the relative 
functions of site-specific and program statements. It then examines 
the appropriate scope of- judicial inquiry and the proper standards 
for reviewing federal program compliance with NEPA. Finally, the 
Note scrutinizes the types of remedies that may be imposed if a pro-
gram does not comply with NEPA and proposes a procedure for de-
termining the proper scope of judicial remedies. 
l. REQUIREMENT FOR A PROGRAM STATEMENT 
An important early decision holding that the requirement of a 
detailed impact statement applied to federal programs was Scientists' 
Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Commission, 7 
which involved an Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) research pro-
gram to develop a liquid metal fast-breeder-reactor.8 The AEC 
had conceded that impact statements were required for each of the 
major test facilities and demonstration plants planned for the breeder 
reactor program.9 The critical issue, however, was whether at some 
point "the Commission must issue a statement for the research and 
development program as a whole, rather than simply for individual 
facilities . . . .mo The court, declaring that the "Commission [had 
taken] an unnecessarily crabbed approach to NEPA" in assuming 
(2d Cir. 1972); Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972); Citizens Organized 
to Defend the Environment, Inc. v. Volpe, 353 F. Supp. 520 (S.D. Ohio 1972). 
For a discussion of early NEPA litigation, see F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN nm 
CoURTS ( 1973). 
6. See, e.g., Cady v. Morton, 527 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1975); Scientists' Institute 
for Public Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Commn., 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 
1973). 
7. 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
8. A fast-breeder-reactor transforms a nonfissionable material into a different, fis-
sionable substance that can fuel an atomic reactor. "It is estimated that after about 
10 years of operation the typical fast-breeder-reactor will produce enough fissionable 
Plutonium-239 not only to refuel itself completely, but also to fuel an additional reac-
tor of comparable size." 481 F.2d at 1083. Development of a fast-breeder-reactor 
was expected to overcome the limitations placed on the use of atomic energy by the 
scarcity of naturally suitable atomic fuel. 481 F.2d at 1083. For a pessimistic opin-
ion on the prospects for development of a feasible fast-breeder-reactor, see A Look 
at the Present Status of the Breeder Reactor Program: Power "Too Cheap to Meter'' 
Revisited, 5 ENVIRONMENTAL L. REP. 50202 (1975). 
9. 481 F.2d at 1085. 
10. 481 F.2d at 1085. For a discussion of the court's view in Scientists' Institute 
as to when a program statement should be prepared, see note 22 infra, 
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that NEPA requirements do not extend to programs, 11 held that the 
program was an action significantly affecting the quality of the envi-
ronment within the meaning of NEPA12 and that an impact state-
ment was thus required not only for each individual facility but also 
for the entire development program. 
To support its decision, -the Scientists' Institute court cited a 
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) 13 memorandum on the 
application of impact statements: 
Individual actions that are related either geographically or as log-
ical parts in a chain of contemplated actions may be more appropri-
ately evaluated in a single program statement. Such a statement 
also appears appropriate in connection with . . . the development of 
a new program that contemplates a number of subsequent actions . 
. . . [T]he program statement has a number of advantages. It 
provides an occasion for a more exhaustive consideration of effects 
and alternatives than would be practicable in a statement on an indi-
vidual action. It ensures consideration of cumulative impacts that 
might be slighted in a case-by-case analysis. And it avoids duplica-
tive reconsideration of basic policy questions .... 14 
Thus, an essential reason for requiring program impact statements 
is that some activities are so interrelated that they will have cumula-
tive or synergistic environmental effects. Where such interrelated-
ness exists, an environmental evaluation of one project will not be 
adequate unless it takes into account the effects of the other projects. 
The court then considered whether the breeder-reactor develop-
11. 481 F.2d at 1086. 
12. 481 F.2d at 1088. 
13. The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) was established by title II 
of NEPA. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4341-47 (1970), as amended by 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4343, 
4346a-b (Supp. 1976). The Council serves, in its primary function, as an advisor 
to the President on environmental matters. Specifically, it assists the President 
in preparing the Environmental Quality Report required by section 201 of NEPA, 
42 U.S.C. § 4341 (1970), gathers information on the quality of the environment, 
reviews the activities of the federal government in light of the national environ-
mental policy articulated in title I of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-35 (1970), as 
amended by 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(2)(D)-(I) (Supp. 1976), and recommends policies 
to the President to promote the improvement of environmental quality. NEPA 
§ 204, 42 u.s.c. § 4344(2)-(4) (1970). 
As to the influence that Council recommendations should have, one court has said 
that "[a]lthough the Guidelines are merely advisory and the Council on Environ-
mental Quality has no authority to prescribe regulations governing compliance with 
NEPA, we would not lightly suggest that the Council, entrusted with the responsibil-
ity of developing and recommending national policies 'to foster and promote the im-
provement of the environmental quality' . . . has misconstrued NEPA." Greene 
County Planning Bd. v. Federal Power Commn., 455 F.2d 412, 421 (2d Cir. 1972), 
quoting NEPA § 204, 42 U.S.C. § 4344 (1970); see Carolina Action v. Simon, 389 
F. Supp. 1244, 1246 (M.D.N.C. 1975). 
14. 481 F.2d at 1087-88 (deletions original), quoting CEQ, Memorandum to Fed-
eral Agencies on Procedures for Improving Environmental Impact Statements (May 
16, 1972) [hereinafter CEQ Memorandum], reprinted in 3 BNA ENVIRONMENT REP. 
82-87 (1972). 
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ment activities were a group of closely related projects for which a 
comprehensive program statement was required. In deciding that 
these projects ought to be evaluated as a unit, the court placed great 
weight on the irreversible commitment that would result from taking 
the first step in the program. Because of the massive investments 
necessary to develop new energy technology, developing a workable 
breeder reactor will necessarily mean that some alternative methods 
of energy production will not be explored.15 When in the future 
new forms of energy must be employed, the only technologies avail-
able will be those developed today.16 Therefore, by engaging in the 
development of breeder reactors now, the government may very well 
be committing itself to using the breeder reactor in the future. 17 
Any impact statement that did not take into consideration the effects 
of relying solely on breeder reactors for energy in the future would 
thus fail to discuss one of the most significant environmental impacts 
of the research and development program. 
Other cases considering the need for a program statement for 
-arguably interrelated projects have also employed the irretrievable 
commitment of resources analysis. 18 In these cases, taking the first 
step would not have precluded future options to the same extent as 
would embarking on the development of a breeder reactor; however, 
making an initial commitment could serve to shift the balance of en-
vironmental costs and economic benefits in favor of completing the 
program. For example, in cases involving highway construction, 
courts have held that in considering the environmental effects, the 
government cannot break a highway project into small segments as 
if each segment had no relation to the completion of the entire high-
way.19 Even though a segment may be justifiable when considered 
in isolation, the construction of that segment may make any alterna-
tive to the entire highway relatively more expensive. Moreover, the 
increased traffic that may result from the completion of one segment 
15. See generally Application of NEPA to Long-Range Technology Development 
Programs: SIPI v. AEC, 3 ENVIRONMENTAL L. REP. 10099, 10099 (1973): "Re-
search in the area has been encouraged within the AEC [Atomic Energy Commis-
sion] for over 20 years, with Congress recently appropriating an average of $100 mil-
lion per year for the program. Future outlays will bring the total to about $2 billion 
by 1980, as much as that spent federally for the development of all other energy 
sources combined." 
16. 481 F.2d at 1090. 
17. 481 F.2d at 1089 n.43. 
18. See, e.g., Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 610 
(D.D.C. 1974); Society for Protection of New Hampshire Forests v. Brinegar, 381 
F. Supp. 282 (D.N.H. 1974). 
19. See Society for Protection of New Hampshire Forests v. Brinegar, 381 F. 
Supp. 282, 287 (D.N.H. 1974); Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 484 F.2d 11, 18 
(8th Cir. 1973). 
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generates additional public and institutional pressures to complete 
the remaining segments. 20 
Thus, the crucial element in the irretrievable commitment test 
for determining the need for a program impact statement is whether 
the taking of a particular action now will so alter the balance of envi-
ronmental cost and economic benefit as to preclude a meaningful 
decision on the program in the future. 21 It is often true that as the 
government invests more in a program, the loss that would be caused 
by abandonment increases and the gross benefits that can be derived 
from completing the program are measured against a decreased cost 
to complete. In such a case, the economic benefit derived from 
completion of the last few segments includes the increased benefit 
that would result from the use of the entire program; thus, for the 
particular highway segment in question, the economic benefits stead-
ily gain weight in comparison with the computed environmental cost, 
which remains the same as the last few individual segments are com-
pleted. Eventually, once a particular initial action has been taken 
in many government programs, the economic benefit to be achieved 
by completion becomes sufficiently great relative to the environmen-
tal and economic costs of completion to make a decision to abandon 
the program highly unlikely.22 
20. See Society for Protection of New Hampshire Forests v. Brinegar, 381 F. 
Supp. 282, 285-86 (D.N.H. 1974). 
Under similar reasoning, the court in Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Calla-
way, 382 F. Supp. 610 (D.D.C. 1974), granted a preliminary injunction to the plain-
tiffs who charged that the environmental impact statement prepared for the renova-
tion and enlargement of a lock on the Mississippi River was inadequate because it 
did not discuss the environmental effects of enlarging all the locks on the waterway. 
The court, in determining that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail in proving that 
the single lock enlargement represented the beginning of a system-wide improvement 
program, relied on the draft version of the environmental impact statement. The 
statement conceded that for the proposed enlarged lock to operate at full capacity, 
a substantially increased amount of traffic and larger vessels had to be allowed to 
reach iL Thus, the Corps of Engineers would be under constant pressure from those 
navigating the river to make the fullest possible use of the enlarged lock by enlarging 
the other locks on the river. 382 F. Supp. at 618-19. 
21. See Scientists' Institute for Pub. Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy 
Commn., 481 F.2d 1079, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (''To wait until a technology attains 
the stage of commercial feasibility before considering the possible adverse environ-
mental effects attendant upon ultimate application of the technology will undoubtedly 
frustrate meaningful consideration and balancing of environmental costs against eco-
nomic and other benefits"). 
22. See Coalition for Safe Nuclear Power v. United States Atomic Energy 
Commn., 463 F.2d 954, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (each increment of government invest-
ment "tilts the balance away from the side of environmental concerns"). 
Having discussed the primary significance of Scientists' Institute-the germination 
of the irretrievable commitment test-it is now appropriate to note the second issue 
presented in the case: Assuming that a program impact statement is required in a 
particular instance, when should it be prepared? The court recognized that "[s]tate-
ments must be written late enough in the development process to contain meaningful 
information, but they must be written early enough so that what information is con-
tained can practically serve as an imput in the decision-making process." 481 F.2d 
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This shift away from environmental concerns is reinforced by the 
creation of institutional pressures to complete a program once it has 
begun. The prime concern of an agency charged with missions 
such as road or dam building is the completion of the program even 
at the expense of the environment. 23 The effects of this mission-
orientation are heightened not only by institutional inertia but also 
by a reluctance of administrators to admit that the program, on which 
large expenditures have been made, would never have been under-
taken had a comprehensive environmental assessment been made at 
the outset. Thus, if an agency is allowed to begin segments of the 
program without first preparing a comprehensive impact statement, 
a bias will be added to the problems already present in attempting 
to make a fair assessment of environmental factors, a bias that is dif-
ficult to identify and correct. 
A separate line of cases has sought to determine whether a proj-
ect was a part of a program for which an impact statement should 
be required by ascertaining whether that specific project had signif-
icance independent of other alleged program elements. 24 A project has 
such significance if it can function alone and if no further actions 
need be taken to derive benefit from it. 25 If a project has an "inde-
pendent significance," it has been held that no program statement 
is required. 26 
One example of the "independent significance" analysis is Trout 
Unlimited, Inc. v. Morton, 21 in which the court sought to determine 
whether an impact statement prepared for the first phase of the two-
at 1094. In the context of fast-breeder-reactor development, the court suggested four 
factors to consider in determining the time for preparation: the likelihood that tho 
technology will prove commercially feasible and the imminence of its doing so, the 
availability of meaningful information as to the effects of applying both the tech-
nology and its alternatives, the creation of irretrievable commitments and the preclu-
sion of options as the development program progresses, and, finally, the severity of 
environmental effects if the technology does prove commercially feasible. 481 F.2d 
at 1094. See CEQ Guidelines on the Preparation of Environmental Impact State-
ments, 40 C.F.R. § 1500.6(d)(2) (1976). This balancing standard is definitely in• 
applicable unless at least one action or project of a contemplated program actually 
has been proposed by the relevant federal agency. See note 53 infra & text at notes 
51-55 infra. In fact, it may have been eliminated altogether, with impact statements 
now necessary only after a particular project or an entire program has been proposed. 
See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 96 S. Ct. 2718, 2728, 2730 n.20 (1976). 
23. See Note, Substantive Review Under the National Environmental Policy 
Acts: EDF v. Corps of Engineers, 3 EcoLOGY L.Q. 173, 197-99 (1973). 
24. See Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974); Sierra Club 
v. Stamm, 507 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1974). For further discussion of the "indepen-
dent significance" approach, see Comment, Planning Level and Program Impact 
Statements Under the National Environmental Policy Act: A Definitional Approach, 
23 UCLA L. REV. 124 (1975). 
25. See Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1285 (9th·Cir. 1974); Sierra 
Club v. Stamm, 507 F.2d 788, 792-93 (10th Cir. 1974). 
26. See cases cited note 25 supra. 
27. 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974). 
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phase Teton Dam and Reservoir Project need also consider the envi-
ronmental effects of the second phase. The first phase included the 
construction of a dam and an electrical generating station and the 
improvement of the local irrigation system. The second phase was 
to provide for the disposition, primarily for irrigation, of the one 
half of the reservoir capacity that was not disposed of by phase one. 
The court observed that the immediate benefits of flood control, irri-
gation, and hydroelectric power would result from the first phase 
whether or not phase two was ever carried out.28 Thus, the court 
ruled that the impact statement need not consider the effects of 
phase two because phase one was substantially independent of the 
second project. 29 • 
To a certain extent, the independent significance test of Trout 
Unlimited and the irreversible commitment test of Scientists' Insti-
tute can be seen as opposite sides of the same coin. 30 The Scientists' 
Institute court required a program statement when the first step com-
pelled the agency to take subsequent actions;31 the Trout Unlimited 
cour.t said an overall statement was not needed when future actions 
were not made necessary by the project in question. 32 The cases 
that require a program statement discuss the irreversible commit-
ment involved88 and the cases that find a program statement to be 
unnecessary direct their analysis toward the finding of independent 
significance. 34 
It would be incorrect to conclude that the result is always deter-
mined by the choice of analysis. Indeed, in many situations the re-
sult would be the same regardless of which test were applied. Still, 
28. 509 F.2d at 1285 n.13. 
29. 509 F.2d at 1285. Furthermore, because the second phase would not be put 
into effect until the Secretary of the Interior submitted a finding of feasibility to the 
Congress and the President, the court concluded that Congress intended the two 
phases of the program to be considered separately. 509 F.2d at 1284-85. 
30. The court in Trout Unlimited, observing that in Scientists' Institute the fast-
breeder-reactor research and development program had no independent significance 
absent future application of the technology developed, see text at notes 7-17 supra, 
specifically pointed out that its analysis was not inconsistent with that of the court 
in Scientists' Institute. The court pointed out that no benefits would result from the 
mere development of fast-breeder-reactor technology; benefits would only result if the 
technology were put into use. In contrast, inimediate benefits would flow from the 
first phase of the Teton Dam and Reservoir project even if phase two were never 
put into effect 509 F.2d at 1285 n.13. 
31. 481 F.2d at 1089-90; see Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Callaway, 
382 F. Supp. 610, 620-22 (D.D.C. 1974). 
32. 509 F.2d at 1285; see Sierra Club v. Stamm, 507 F.2d 788, 792-93 (10th Cir. 
1974). 
33. See Scientists' Institute for Pub. Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy 
Commn., 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. 
Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 610 (D.D.C. 1974). 
34. See Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974); Sierra 
Club v. Stamm, 507 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1974). 
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there have been cases, for example Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe 
Ry. v. Callaway,35 in which the result has depended on the test. In 
that case, the Army Corps of Engineers planned to rebuild and enlarge 
one of a series of locks on the Mississippi River. When the Scientists' 
Institute test of irreversible commitment is applied, a program state-
ment on the related network of locks and dams is properly called 
for.36 First, use of the increased capacity of the one lock would ne-
cessitate the modification or rebuilding ·of other dams and locks. 37 If 
the environmental impacts of each lock were considered separately, 
the economic benefits to be gained through the additional use of 
completed locks would then be balanced against the environmental 
loss caused by the construction of only the lock under consideration. 
This results because the completi9n of each new lock contributes to 
the derivation of benefits from all other locks while only the environ-
mental damage caused by the construction of the individual lock 
being proposed would be considered. 38 In such a situation it is un-
likely that an agency would determine the environmental costs to 
outweigh the economic benefits. 
Moreover, by focusing on the environmental impact of only indi-
vidual locks within the system, the Corps precludes a meaningful con-
sideration of alternatives to expanding the complete waterway sys-
tem. As each lock is constructed the remaining cost of completion 
in both economic and environmental terms for the whole program 
is reduced. Consequently, when the waterway system is then com-
pared to such alternative transportation systems as a railway, the rela-
tive economic and environmental costs will be shifted in favor of 
completing the partially constructed network. A comprehensive 
evaluation of the environmental impact of the entire lock and dam 
program conducted before the commencement of individual projects 
may result in the selection of an alternative that will cause less envi-
ronmental damage. 
However, when the independent significance test is applied to 
the plan to enlarge an individual lock, a contrary result is obtained. 
Even though full use of the expanded lock would not occur unless 
all the locks were enlarged, substantial benefit would result from re-
modelling only the one lock, i.e., the existing river traffic could use 
35. 382 F. Supp. 610 (D.D.C. 1974). 
36. The court in Atchison did rely on the irreversible commitment test set forth 
in Scientists' Institute, and decided that a program statement was necessary. The de-
cision was based on the finding that there was a comprehensive plan to enlarge the 
Mississippi river lock and dam system. See 382 F. Supp. at 620-22; note 20 supra. 
37. 382 F. Supp. at 622; see note 20 supra. 
38. This assumes that all the environmental harm results from the construction 
and the operating of the locks and not from the increased river traffic. If the in-
crease in traffic had environmental effects, the degree to which construction of each 
lock would increase traffic would have to be considered in each site-specific evalua-
tion. 
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a modern facility instead of the outmoded lock that it replaced. Be-
cause the rebuilt lock would have independent significance, the 
Trout Unlimited test would not require a program statement. 
In addition to yielding contradictory results in certain cases, the 
irreversible commitment and independent significance tests will .not 
require program statements in all cases in which one is desirable. 
The CEQ memorandum, upon which -the Scientists' Institute court re-
lied, stated that program statements may be required for a group 
of "[i]ndividual actions that are related either geographically or as 
logical parts in a chain of contemplated actions."39 This lan-
guage is neither limited to actions that will result in an irreversible 
commitment nor excludes actions that have an independent signif-
icance. The memorandum states that one of the purposes of requir-
ing a program statement is to evaulate cumulative effects of the pro-
gram "that might be slighted .in a case-by-case analysis."40 This pur-
pose would not be served if the cumulative effects of independently 
significant projects that were actually program components were not 
considered in a program statement. 
The dissent to the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit in Sierra Club v. Morton41 provides one ex-
ample of how neither the irreversible commitment nor the independent 
significance test would require a program statement when environ-
mental considerations of the type described in the CEQ memorandum 
seem to warrant preparing such a statement. In this case involving the 
development of the coal resources of the Northern Great Plains area, 
the dissent would not have required a program impact statement be-
cause each coal mine had independent significance and because 
granting a permit for one mine would not irreversibly commit the 
government to approving another mine later. The dissent pointed 
out that the agencies had required each individual impact statement 
to consider the cumulative impacts of the related developments. 42 
However, if the cumulative effects of all the projects are con-
ceded to have an environmental .impact deserving of consideration, 
it would seem more rational to consider the overall effects before, 
not after, development is begun. If the cumulative effects are only 
considered as each mine is proposed, it is possible that the environ-
mentally worst operation, i.e., that which causes the most damage 
to the environment, would be permitted if it were proposed early, 
when the cumulative effects were at a low level, and that the envi-
39. See CEQ Memorandum. 
40. See id. 
41. 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975), revd., 96 S. Ct. 2718 (1976). Judge Mac-
Kinnon wrote the Court of Appeals dissenting opinion. 514 F.2d at 884. For a dis-
cussion of the majority opinion, see text at notes 45-55 infra. 
42. 514 F.2d at 886 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). 
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ronmentally best project would not be allowed if proposed later, 
when even a slight impact would bring the cumulative effect to an 
intolerable level. Had a comprehensive environmental evaluation 
been made before development on individual projects began, proj-
ects could have been selected to provide the greatest use of coal re-
sources at the smallest environmental cost. 43 
The approach of the majority in Sierra Club v. Morton would 
have filled the gap left open by the independent significance and 
irreversible commitment tests; it involved independent judicial ex-
amination of the actions of the Interior Department to determine 
whether the government had, in fact, contemplated a program re-
gardless of whether the agency declared the actions to constitute a 
program.44 However, in Kleppe v. Sierra Club4 r; the Supreme Court 
reversed the court of appeals. The Court concluded that NEPA re-
quired impact statements only for actions that are actually proposed 
by the agency and not merely contemplated. 46 On the facts the 
court determined that there was no proposed regional program; all 
actions that had been proposed were either local or national in 
scope47 and each had an impact statement that was not disputed. 46 
Yet the Court did, at least, suggest an approach to defining the 
need for program statements that is broader than either the inde-
pendent significance or the irreversible commitment analyses. It 
43. In Cady v. Morton, 527 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1975), the court implicitly recog-
nized the inadequacy of the independent significance test. Cady involved a lease of 
mineral rights in coal by the Crow Indians to a private company, which the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs approved without preparing an environmental impact statement. 
The lease covered 30,876.45 acres and ran for ten years and as long thereafter as 
coal was produced in paying quantities. Thereafter, the company entered into con-
tracts to supply 77,000,000 tons of coal over twenty years to four utility companies. 
When the company applied for federal governmental approval of a mining plan cover-
ing operations for five years on 770 acres of the leased land, the BIA prepared an 
impact statement for that plan. In holding that an impact statement was required 
for the lease of all the land for coal mining, the court said that 
- [w]hile it is true that each mining plan prepared for tracts within the lensed 
area is to a significant degree an independent project which requires a separate 
[impact statement] with respect to each, it is no less true that the breadth and 
scope of the possible projects made possible by the Secretary's approval of the 
leases require the type of comprehensive study that NEPA mandates adequately 
to inform the Secretary of the possible environmental consequences of his ap-
proval. [The leasing company's] massive capital investment and extended con-
tractual commitments present a situation in which "it would be irrational, or at 
least unwise, to undertake the first phase if subsequent phases were not also un-
dertaken." . . . However, even were this not true, it cannot be denied that the 
environmental consequences of several strip mining projects extending over twen-
ty years or more within a tract of 30,876.45 acres will be significantly different 
from those which will accompany [the leasing company's] activities on a single 
tract of 770 acres. 
527 F.2d at 795 (citation omitted). 
44. 514 F.2d at 873. 
45. 96 S. Ct. 2718 (1976). 
46. 96 S. Ct. at 2728-29. 
47. 96 S. Ct. at 2725. 
48. 96 S. Ct. at 2726. 
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noted that, in general, "[c]umulative environmental impacts are, in-
deed, what require a comprehensive impact statement. "49 The 
Court also specifically identified "the extent of the interrelationship 
among the proposed actions and the practical considerations of feasi-
bility" as being among the relevant factors that must be considered. 50 
There was no mention of any requirement that an irreversible com-
mitment be present nor were actions that are independently signif-
icant excluded from being considered a part of a broader program 
that would require an impact statement. This approach thus pro-
vides the basis for an analysis that will encompass a broader range 
of action for which a program statement ought to be required and 
in this regard is a doctrinal advance along the lines suggested by the 
CEQ memorandum. 
Despite the broad implications that Kleppe may have for the evo-
lution of standards for ascertaining whether a progrm exists, the 
holding of the Court on when an action requires an impact state-
ment may significantly restrict the effectiveness of NEPA in forcing 
agencies to consider pr9gram environmental impacts early in their 
decision-making process. The Court, as noted above, rejected the 
position of the court of appeals that an agency may be required to 
begin preparing an impact statement prior to the recommendation 
or report on a proposal for an action. 51 A court, then, has no role 
in the process of considering environment impacts until a report or 
recommendation on the proposal for an action is made. 52 This con-
struction of NEPA requires that the program statements encompass 
only those actions that have been proposed, not those that are merely 
contemplated. 53 Unfortunately, the Kleppe majority offered no 
49. 96 S. Ct at 2732. 
50. 96 S. Ct. at 2731. In the context of projects geographically interrelated, the 
Court said that it was the role of the responsible federal agency to determine whether 
-a comprehensive regional statement is needed and, if so, to determine the appropriate 
region. The agency determination will not be disturbed unless it is shown that the 
agency acted arbitrarily. See 96 S. Ct at 2731. 
51. 96 S. Ci. at 2728-29. The Court of Appeals had devised a balancing test in-
volving four factors to determine when an agency must begin preparing a statement: 
How likely is the program to come to fruition, and how soon will that occur? 
To what extent is meaningful information presently available on the effects of 
implementation of the program, and of alternatives and their effects? To what 
extent are irretrievable commitments being made and options precluded as re-
finement of the proposal progresses? How severe will be the environmental ef-
fects if the program is implemented? 
514 F.2d at 880. See note 22 supra. 
52. 96 S. Ct. at 2729. 
53. "The statute, however, speaks solely in terms of proposed actions; it does not 
require an agency to consider the possible environmental impacts of less imminent 
actions when preparing the impact statement on proposed actions." 96 S. Ct. at 2730 
n.20 (emphasis original). However, Kleppe should not mean that program state-
ments are no longer necessary in cases such as Scientists' Institute, see text at notes 
7-17 supra, in which early actions irreversibly commit the agency to an entire group 
of actions. The point of the irreversible commitment analysis is that by proposing 
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guidance for distinguishing "proposed" and "contemplated" actions. 
As the dissent noted, both the statute and the legislative history shed 
little light on this question. 54 It is therefore unclear to what extent 
Kleppe will reduce the comprehensiveness of program statements. 
There is no doubt, however, that the Court has adopted an approach 
that will substantially limit timely judicial review of an agency's com-
pliance with its obligations under NEPA to integrate the considera-
tion of environmental effects into its decision-making process.1m 
Now that the basic requirement that an agency prepare program 
impact statements has been established, it is appropriate to consider 
the functions of a program statement. This discussion will make it 
even more evident why courts should strictly enforce statement require-
ments for programs. First, it is necessary to review the policies of 
NEPA that are fulfilled by both site-specific and program impact 
statements. The relative roles of site-specific and program impact 
statements in accomplishing specific purposes of NEPA will then be 
analyzed. 
According to the CEQ Guidelines, the purpose of requiring im-
pact statements is to assist agencies in carrying out the environmental 
protection policies of NEPA.56 Specifically, section 102(2)(c) of 
NEPA requires agencies to build into their decision-making proc-
esses a consideration of the environmental effects of their activities. 117 
one action, an agency is in effect proposing the whole series of activities to which 
the agency is irreversibly committed. If later actions inevitably follow from early 
actions, it is meaningless to say that such later actions are only "contemplated." Cf. 
96 S. Ct. at 2732 n.26. 
54. 96 S. Ct. at 2735 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part): 
"A statute that imposes a complicated procedural requirement on all 'proposals' for 
'major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment' 
and then assiduously avoids giving any hint, either expressly or by way of legislative 
history, of what is meant by a 'proposal' or by a 'major Federal action' can hardly 
be termed precise." 
55. The dissent stated that "this vaguely worded statute seems designed to serve 
as no more than a catalyst for development of a 'common law' of NEPA," 96 S. Ct. 
at 2735, and, thus, that courts should be able to create mechanisms to enforce the 
duties imposed by NEPA. 
The dissent relied on two policies in support of requiring agencies to begin prep-
aration of an impact statement before a proposal is made. First, because the prepara-
tion of an impact statement involves a significant amount of time, an agency must 
begin preparation early enough to complete it by the time a decision on the project · 
must be made. 96 S. Ct. at 2734 ("because an early start in preparing an impact 
statement is necessary if an agency is to comply with NEPA, there comes a time 
when an agency that fails to begin preparation of a statement on a contemplated proj-
ect is violating the law''). Second, the essential policy of NEPA, see text at notes 
1-3 supra, requires consideration of the environmental effects of a project throughout 
the entire planning and decision-making process. 96 S. Ct. at 2734. 
56. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.l(a) (1976). 
51. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.l(a) (1976); see Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennes-
see Valley Authority, 468 F.2d 1164, 1174 (6th Cir. 1972), application for stay de-
nied, 414 U.S. 1036 (1973). 
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The impact statement is intended to provide the decision-makers 
with the information needed to consider the impact on the environ-
ment;58 it is not supposed to serve only as a post hoc rationalization 
of decisons already made. 59 Furthermore, the impact statement is 
intended to guide not only the agency but also the ultimate decision-
makers, Congress and the President. 60 
A second major purpose of the impact statement is to alert inter-
ested parties to the environmental consequences of a proposed ac-
tion. 61 These interested parties may suggest alternatives that will 
reduce the environmental damage or may identify additional envi-
ronmental costs of which the agency was not aware. 62 In this man-
58. See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy 
Commn., 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
59. Jones v. District of Columbia Redev. Land Agency, 499 F.2d 502, 511 (D.C. 
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975). 
One writer, questioning the extent to which environmental factors are actually 
considered as part of the decision-making process, concludes that NEPA bas resulted 
in agency preparation of after-the-fact rationalizations that are designed not to influ-
ence the decision made, but rather to survive legal challenge. F. ANDERSON, supra 
note 5, at 288. However, the writer concedes that the early NEPA cases bav~ laid 
a groundwork for eventual improvement in federal decision-making. Id. at 288-93. 
The Acting Director of Civil Works of the Army Corps of Engineers, Kenneth E. 
McIntyre, bas testified that about one out of every three civil works projects bas been 
modified as a result of agency efforts induced by NEPA. Hearings on Oversight of 
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 to Assess Certain Federal Agencies' 
Compliance Thereto and to Review Implementation Problems Before the Subcomm. 
on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House Comm. 
on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 94-14, at 3 (1975). 
60. See Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 1973); Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 833 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
61. See Jones v. District of Columbia Redev. Land Agency, 499 F.2d 502, 511 
(D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975); Note, Judicial Review, Delega-
tion, and Public Hearings Under NEPA, 1974 DUKE L.J. 423, 440. 
62. Cf. Jones v. District of Columbia Redev. Land Agency, 499 F.2d 502, 511 
(D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975). 
In order to comply with section 102(2)(C) of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) 
(1970), which requires that an agency solicit comments on its plans prior to prepar-
ing the environmental impact statement, agencies must prepare two impact statements 
-a draft statement and a final statement. See 40 C.F.R. § 1500.7(a) (1976). The 
draft statement must circulate for review and comment to federal and federal-state 
agencies that have jurisdiction by law, or have special expertise with respect to the 
environmental effect involved, 40 C.F.R. § 1500.9(a)(l) (1976), and to the public. 
40 C.F.R. § 1500.9(d) (1976). Before preparing the final statement, which must 
also be circulated for comment, comments received on the draft statement are to be 
carefully evaluated and considered. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.7(a) (1976). Copies of sub-
stantive comments received on the draft statement are to be attached to the final 
statement whether or not the agency decides to discuss the comments in the text 
of the final statement. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.l0(a) (1976). It should be emphasized 
that only the final statement satisfies NEPA; a draft statement prepared without the 
solicitation of comments does not fulfill the requirements of section 102(2) (C). 
To inform the public of the availability of impact statements for comment, the 
CEQ publishes monthly the 102 Monitor, which lists the impact statements filed with 
the CEQ during the preceding month and tells who in the agency may be contacted 
to provide information about the statement. The 102 Monitor should list all impact 
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ner, the agency will gather more information to help it make an ap-
propriate deicision. 
Although these general comments about the purpose of impact 
statements apply to both program and site-specific statements, the 
two types of statements address different issues and serve different 
functions. 63 Basically, the site-specific statement focuses upon the 
environmental impact of one project. However, because the total 
impact of a program is greater than the sum of the impacts of the 
individual projects, a program statement should evaluate the cumula-
tive environmental effects of all the projects. 64 Although each site-
specific statement may report the cumulative effects of the projects 
thus far undertaken, such a procedure does not assist comprehensive 
environmental planning, 65 one of the basic functions of the impact 
statement, 66 because some of the actions would already have been 
taken. 
Another function of program statements is to settle broad ques-
tions of policy.67 For example, general alternatives to the program 
would be dealt with in the program statement and then need not 
be reevaluated in every site-specific statement. 68 The site-specific 
statements would then discuss alternatives only to particular projects, 
such as alternative sites. 69 
It might be argued that an agency may avoid preparing a pro-
gram statement by discussing questions of policy and alternatives in 
the site-specific statements. However, the cumulative effects of pro-
grams cannot be adequately considered in the planning stages without 
a program evaluation. Therefore, discussing broad policy issues in 
site-specific statements would not spare an agency the efforts of pre-
paring a program statement. Considerations of efficiency would then 
mandate a discussion of all matters pertaining to the program at one 
time. There is no need to reconsider basic questions in every site-
specific statement. 70 
statements prepared because section 102(2)(C) of NEPA requires the agencies to file 
a copy of their statements with the CEQ. 
63. See Scientists' Institute for Pub. Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy 
Commn., 481 F.2d 1079, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Application of NEPA to Long-
Range Technology Development Programs: SIP/ v. AEC, supra note 15, at 10099, 
10100. 
64. CEQ, Memorandum; see Application of NEPA to Long-Range Technology 
Development Programs: SIP/ v. AEC, supra note 15, at 10099. 
65. See text at notes 41-43 supra. 
66. See text at notes 56-60 supra. 
67. See CEQ Memorandum. See generally Application of NEPA to Long-Range 
Technology Development Programs: SIP/ v. AEC, supra note 15, at 10099. 
68. See CEQ Memorandum. Of course, in a long-range program a change in un-
derlying assumptions may warrant revision of the program statement. 
69. See Comprehensive Planning Under NEPA: D.C. Circuit Widens Applicabil-
ity of Program Impact Statements, 5 ENVIRONMENTAL L. REP. 10118, 10122 (1975). 
70. Cf. CEQ Memorandum. 
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Although the Scientists' Institute court said that it was of "little 
moment" whether the program analysis was issued separately or as 
part of a statement for a p~ticular project, it recognized that the 
program statement discusses different issues and addresses a differ-
ent audience than does the site-specific statement. 71 The court ex-
pressed the opinion that it would make more sense to issue a sep-
arate program statement than to burden a site-specific statement with 
the program analysis. 72 Later courts have required a separate pro-
gram evaluation in addition to the evaluation for each individual 
project. 73 Such a requirement for multiple impact statements has 
been labelled by some commentators as "tiering."74 Each level or 
tier deals with different issues, although each relies upon the findings 
of the other tiers. 75 
II. JUDICIAL REvmw OF IMPACT STATEMENTS 
Once an impact statement for a major federal action has been 
prepared, two questions concerning judicial review inevitably arise: 
First, what is the proper scope of judicial review of agency action, 
and, second, what is the appropriate standard of review? Although 
it is clear that agency compliance with NEPA is subject to judicial 
review, 76 the courts do not agree on what obligations NEPA imposes 
on the federal agencies and, consequently, they do not agree on the 
extent of judicial review that is appropriate. To date, the cases that 
have dealt with these questions have involved only single projects, 
and it is thus on the basis of these cases that an initial delineation 
71. 481 F.2d 1079, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
72. 481 F.2d at 1092-93. 
73. See Cady v. Morton, 527 F.2d 786, 795 (9th Cir. 1975); CEQ Memorandum. 
74. See Comprehensive Planning Under NEPA: D.C. Circuit Widens Applica-
bility of Program Impact Statements, supra note 69, at 10122; F. ANDERSON, supra 
note 5, at 280 n.91. 
75. See F. ANDERSON, supra note 5, at 290-91: 
For instance, the alternative of flood-plain zoning could be exhaustively consid-
ered in an early comprehensive statement on the best way to manage a river ba-
sin; that alternative need not then be comprehensively reconsidered in statements 
on particular projects if the decision is made to construct a series of dams or 
river levees. The latter statements could focus on localized impacts, without the 
agency's having failed to give the comprehensive early environmental review 
called for by NEPA. 
76. NEPA does not expressly provide for judicial review. See F. ANDERSON, su-
pra note 5, at 13. However, the Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 5 U.S.C. §§ 
701-706 (1970), creates a presumption of reviewability of agency action. See, e.g., 
National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650, 655 n.12 (10th Cir. 1971); Note, 
The Least Adverse Alternative Approach to Substantive Review Under NEPA, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 735, 741 (1975). The presumption is conclusive unless judicial review 
is precluded either by statute or because "agency action is committed to agency dis-
cretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1970). Because NEPA contains no express 
prohibition of judicial review and the Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted the 
agency discretion exemption, see Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 
U.S. 402,410 (1971), no court has denied reviewability. 
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of the principles of judicial review must be made. The application 
of these principles to the review of program statements will then be 
considered. 
All courts have recognized that section 102 of ~PA77 imposes 
certain procedural requirements on agency decision-making78 and 
that these requirements are judicially enforceable. 79 Included in 
these procedures is the requirement that for each major federal ac-
tion significantly affecting the quality of the environment, the agency 
must prepare a detailed statement. 80 This statement must describe 
the environmental effect of the project, alternatives to tlle proposed 
action, and any irretrievable commitment of resources that would re-
sult from the action.81 
Although the requirement that agencies prepare impact state-
ments has probably been the greatest source of NEPA litigation, 
there are additional procedural requirements of section 102 that are 
designed to insure that the agencies develop and use sound environ-
mental planning methods. 82 The agencies are required to use the 
social and natural sciences and the environmental design arts in an 
interdisciplinary approach to planning;83 to develop methods- to give 
appropriate consideration in decision-making to presently unquanti-
fied environmental factors;84 and to develop alternatives to proposed 
actions involving "unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of 
available resources. "85 NEPA also orders the agencies to co-
operate with the Council on Environmental Quality and international, 
state, and local agencies in environmental planning. 86 Thus, full 
compliance with NEPA procedures means not only complying with 
the requirement for an environmental impact statement but also ob-
serving all of the other dictates of section 102. 87 
77. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970), as amended by 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(2)(D)-(I) 
(Supp. 1976). 
78. These "action-forcing" procedures are designed to insure that the environ-
mental protection policies of the statute, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970), are put into ef-
fect See S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1969); Robie, Recognition of 
Substantive Rights Under NEPA, 7 NAT. REsoURcES LAw. 387,393 (1974). 
79. See, e.g., Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974); Na-
tional Helium Corp. v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 
U.S. 993 (1974); Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1971 ). 
80. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970). 
81. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970). 
82. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of the United 
States Army, 492 F.2d 1123, 1132 (5th Cir. 1974). 
83. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A) (1970). 
84. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (B) (1970). 
85. 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(2) (E) (Supp. 1976). 
86. 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(2) (F)-(I) (Supp. 1976). 
81. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of the United 
States Army, 492 F.2d 1123, 1132 (5th Cir. 1974). 
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Even though NEPA establishes specific procedural requirements 
and directs all federal agencies to carry out these section 102 re-
quirements "to the fullest extent possible,"88 it does not provide 
standards of judicial review of agency compliance with them. The 
courts must therefore devise a standard of review that will give 
meaning to this directive. 
The courts seem to agree on a "rule of reason" standard for re-
viewing compliance with the NEPA procedures.89 For example, in 
preparing impact statements, agencies may be faced with the prob-
lem that not all information called for is known or presently discover-
able. Under the rule of reason approach of the Scientists' Institute 
court, 00 an agency would not be expected to be as detailed in its 
discussion of remote effects as it is in its consideration of immediate 
impacts. 91 Where environmental effects are unknown, it is the func-
tion of the impact statement to point out the lack of knowledge.92 
But an agency cannot "avoid drafting an impact statement simply be-
cause describing the environmental effects of and alternatives to par-
ticular agency action involves some degree of forecasting."93 The 
heart of agency responsibility under NEPA is to predict the environ-
mental effects of a proposed action. 94 
Although the courts purport to apply the same test of reasonable-
ness, it is not at all clear that a uniform, well-defined standard exists. 
Several courts have recognized that the standards for procedural re-
view are still in the process of evolution and currently have more 
of an ad hoc nature than may be desirable.95 Consequently, any 
88. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970), as amended by 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(2) (D)-(I) 
(Supp. 1976). 
89. M.ost courts apply the reasonableness standard without indicating a statutory 
source for the test. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers 
of the United States Army, 492 F.2d 1123, 1131 (5th Cir. 1974); National Helium 
Corp. v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995, 1002 (10th Cir. 1973 ), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 
(1974); Scientists' Institute for Pub. Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Commn., 
481 F.2d 1079, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463 
(5th Cir. 1973); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 
834 (D.C. Cir. 1972). However, some courts have relied on the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act § 10(e)(B)(4), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D) (1970), which calls for courts 
to declare unlawful agency actions taken "without observance of procedure required 
by law," in applying the standard of reasonableness. See Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 
509 F.2d 1276, 1283 (9th Cir. 1974); Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677, 688 (9th 
Cir. 1974). But see National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995, 995 (10th Cir. 
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974). 
90. 481 F.2d at 1092. 
91. See 481 F.2d at 1092; Applicability of NEPA to Long-Range Technology De-
velopment Programs: SIPI v. AEC, supra note 15, at 10100. 
92. See 481 F.2d at 1092; Applicability of NEPA to Long-Range Technology De-
velopment Programs: SIPI v. AEC, supra note 15, at 10100. 
93. 481 F.2d at 1092. 
94. 481 F.2d at 1092. 
95. See Cady v. Morton, 527 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1975); Trout Unlimited v . .Mor-
ton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1282-83 (9th Cir. 1974). The Trout court relied on the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act § 10(e)(B)(4), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D) (1970), in applying 
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discussion of the standard of review of procedural compliance must 
remain somewhat general and episodic. 
A good example of the ad hoc nature of procedural review is 
Trout Unlimited v. Morton,96 in which the court was faced with a 
challenge to an impact statement for a dam and reservoir project. 
The plaintiffs alleged that, inter alia, the statement failed to discuss 
adequately many possible environmental consequences, possible 
measures that could be taken to minimize the environmental harm, 
and alternatives to the proposed dam and reservoir. 97 
In response to the first allegation that certain environmental ef-
fects, such as the building of docks and summer homes along the 
reservoir once it was completed, were not discussed, the court deter-
mined that while the statement would have been improved by a dis-
cussion of these consequences, the statement was nonetheless ade-
quate for the purposes of the statute. 98 In deciding that there was 
adequate discussion in the impact statement of possible measures to 
mitigate environmental harm, 99 the court's examination was more 
perfunctory. It confined itself merely to noting that mitigation 
measures were discussed under eight separate headings, which, pre-
sumably, covered all possibilities.100 Again, the court conceded that 
the discussion, though adequate, could have been better.101 Finally, 
the court also found the discussion of alternatives to be adequate.102 
Taking the agency conclusions about the alternatives that were con-
sidered in the impact statement at face value, the court was primarily 
a standard of reasonablenes.s. See note 89 supra. This statutory provision requires 
courts to set aside agency actions taken "without observance of procedure required 
by law." The failure of this statutory language to provide specific guidelines for re-
viewing agency actions was noted by the court: 
The "without observance of procedure required by law" . . . standard, how-
ever, is less helpful in reviewing the sufficiency of an EIS than one might wish. 
Its difficulty lies in the fact that the "procedure required by law" by which the 
sufficiency of the EIS is measured consists substantially of judicial responses, to 
specific allegations of insufficiency directed at specific impact statements pre-
pared in connection with particular projects that were challenged in various fed-
eral courts. Neither NEPA nor the "Guidelines" of the Council on Environ-
mental Quality set forth sufficiently comprehensive "procedures" to obviate the 
necessity to resort to such judicial responses. The consequence has been and, 
to a degree, is that the judicial review of the adequacy of an EIS employs stand-
ards fashioned to meet the needs of the particular case in which the standards 
are applied. In due course the presence of a large volume of case law and the 
principle of stare decisis will yield reasonably precise "procedural rules" by 
which the adequacy of an EIS can be measured. That time, however, has not 
arrived. 
509 F.2d at 1282-83 (citations omitted). 
96. 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974). 
91. See 509 F.2d at 1281. 
98. 509 F.2d at 1283-84. 
99. 509 F.2d at 1284. 
100. 509 F.2d at 1284. 
101. 509 F.2d at 1284. 
102. 509 F.2d at 1286. 
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interested in whether a sufficient range of alternatives had been dis-
cussed.103 The court did determine from the record that other alter-
natives, though not discussed in the impact statement, had been con-
sidered and rejected.104 
The response of the Trout Unlimited court to these specific alle-
gations of statement inadequacy does not seem to follow a consistent 
pattern. In the first instance, the court examined the record to see 
whether the agency's conclusion that certain environmental conse-
quences were remote possibilities was correct.105 At the other ex-
treme was the approach of the court in judging the adequacy of the 
possible mitigation measures; it simply concluded from the form of 
the discussion-that is, from the existence of eight topic headings-
that the discussion was adequate.106 These examples show the ad 
hoc nature of procedural review, which seems to be carried out on 
an issue by issue basis. 
Many of the circuits have come to hold that NEPA not only cre-
ates these procedural obligations but also creates substantive require-
ments.107 This, of course, is a departure from the early cases that 
concluded there were only procedural duties108 and from the few 
recent cases that continue to maintain that position.109 According 
to the courts that have found substantive duties, judicial review ap-
propriately serves two purposes: to determine whether the decision-
making procedures of NEPA have been used and to examine 
whether the final agency decision is consistent with the environmen-
tal goals of the statute. llO 
103. 509 F.2d at 1286. 
104. 509 F.2d at 1286. 
105. 509 F.2d at 1283-86. 
106. 509 F.2d at 1284. 
107. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of the United 
States Army, 492 F.2d 1123, 1139-40 (5th Cir. 1974); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 486 
F.2d 946, 952 (7th Cir. 1973); Conservation Council v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664, 664-
65 (4th Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Tennessee Valley Au-
thority, 371 F. Supp. 1004, 1013-14 (E.D. Tenn.), application for stay denied, 414 
U.S. 1036 (1973), ajfd., 492 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1974); Cohen & Warren, Judicial 
Recognition of the Substantive Requirements of the National Environmental Policy 
Act of 1969, 13 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 685 (1972); Yarrington, Judicial Review 
of Substantive Agency Decisions: A Second Generation of Cases Under the National 
Environmental Policy Act, 19 S.D. L. REv. 279 (1974); Robie, supra note 78, at 398-
412; cf. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy 
Commn., 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("The reviewing courts probably 
cannot reverse a substantive decision on its merits . . . unless it be shown that the 
actual balance of costs and benefits that was struck was arbitrary or clearly gave in-
sufficient weight to environmental values"). 
108. See Yarrington, supra note 107, at 280-84. 
109. See Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1282 (9th Cir. 1974); La-
than v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677, 692 (9th Cir. 1974); Jicarilla Apache Tribe of Indi-
ans v. Morton, 471 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1973); National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 
455 F.2d 650, 656 (10th Cir. 1971). 
110. See, e.g., Arkansas Community Organization for Reform Now v. Brinegar, 
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Although the statute contains no language explicitly creating sub-
stantive obligations, 111 the courts and commentators have based their 
finding of substantive NEPA rights in part on the language and struc-
ture of the statute. One of the provisions in which the courts have 
found substantive rights is section l0l(b).112 This section enumer-
ates specific goals toward which the conduct of the agencies must 
be directed as they seek to fulfill the general environmental protec-
tion policy of section l0l(a).113 The opening paragraph of section 
l0l(b) instructs the agencies to use "all practicable means" to 
achieve these goals. The fact that the section l0l(b) goals are to 
be accomplished "in order to carry out the policy" of the statute indi-
cates that the creation of the goals itself was intended to be more 
than a statement of policy.114 
The second source of substantive obligations found in the lan-
guage of the statute is section 102.115 This section specifically re-
quires that "to the fullest ex:tent possible . . . the policies, regula-
tions, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and 
administered in accordance with the policies [of the statute]."116 
Although section 102(2) sets forth only NEPA procedural require-
ments, it is clear that "[t]he procedures included in [section] 102 
. of NEPA are not ends in themselves. "117 According to the Senate 
Report, the purpose of the section 10(2) requirements is "to estab-
lish action-forcing procedures which will help to insure that the poli-
cies enunciated in section 101 are implemented."118 
398 F. Supp. 685, 695 (E.D. Ark. 1975), affd. sub. nom. Arkansas Community Or-
ganization for Reform Now v. Coleman, 531 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1976); Note, Judi-
cial Review Under the National Environmental Policy Act, 38 Mo. L. RBV. 658, 661 
(1973). 
A third situation appropriate for judicial review arises when the method~ adopted 
by an agency for preparation of the impact statement are challenged on the ground 
that they do not comply with NEPA. See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. 
v. United States Atomic Energy Commn., 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
111. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of the 
United States Army, 342 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. Ark.), affd., 410 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 
1912), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973); Yarrington, supra note 107, at 294. 
112. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1970). 
113. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1970); see Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. 
Corps of Engineers of the United States Army, 470 F.2d 289, 297 (8th Cir. 1972), 
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973). 
114. See Yarrington, supra note 107, at 294. 
115. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970), as amended by 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(2)(D)-(I) 
(Supp. 1976). 
116. 42 u.s.c. § 4332(1) (1970). 
117. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of the United 
States Army, 470 F.2d 289, 298 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973). 
118. S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1969). 
However, legislative history has also been used to support the position that NEPA 
created only procedural requirements. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. 
Corps of Engineers of the United States Army, 325 F. Supp. 749, 755 (E.D. Ark. 
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On the basis of this language, one court has concluded that 
"[t]he unequivocal intent of NEPA is to require the agencies to con-
sider and give effect to the environmental goals set forth in the Act, 
not just to file detailed impact studies which will fill governmental 
archives."110 Because they have found substantive obligations and 
because of the presumption of reviewability that applies to agency 
actions, these courts conclude that they are obligated to enforce the 
substantive duties created by NEPA.120 _ 
This interpretation is certainly the better view. Those courts 
that recognize only procedural duties seem to dismiss as mere rhet-
oric121 the entire section of the act thc!,t declares a national environ-
mental policy.122 It is unreasonable to maintain that Congress would 
have enacted such a policy without establishing an effective means 
of effectuating it.123 Review of compliance with section 102 proce-
dures alone will insure that environmental factors are brought to the 
attention of the agencies, but will provide no guarantee that the 
agencies actually will reach a result that is consistent with the goals of 
NEPA.124 Only enforcement of the substantive obligations will 
force the agencies to achieve those statutory goals. 
Although the substantive provisions of section 101(b)125 are 
1971) ("The Act appears to reflect a compromise which, in the opinion of the Court, 
falls short of creating the type of 'substantive rights' claimed by the plaintiffs. Ap-
parently the sponsors could obtain agreement only upon an Act which declared the 
national environmental policy. This represents a giant step, but just a step"); Yar-
rington, supra note 107, at 284. 
119. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of the United States 
Army, 470 F.2d 289,297 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973). 
120. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of the 
United States Army, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973); 
Arkansas Community Organized for Reform Now v. Brinegar, 398 F. Supp. 685 (E.D. 
Ark. 1975), affd. sub. nom. Arkansas Community Organization for Reform Now v. 
Coleman, 531 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1976). 
121. See cases-cited note 109 supra. 
122. 42 u.s.c. § 4331 (1970). 
123. See Yarrington, supra note 107, at 294. 
124. Cf. Note, supra note 110, at 664. 
125. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1970): 
(b) In order to carry out the policy set forth in this chapter, it is the con-
tinuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means, 
consistent with other essential considerations of national policy, to improve and 
coordinate federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end that the 
Nation may-
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environ-
ment for succeeding generations; 
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and 
culturally pleasing surroundings; 
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without 
degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended conse-
quences; 
( 4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national 
heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diver-
sity and variety of individual choice; 
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which will per-
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framed in general language, courts have found the substantive obli-
gations sufficiently definite to guide their review.126 Subject to one 
qualification, section 101 requires federal agencies to conduct their 
activities in a way that will not unduly harm the environment. 127 In 
addition, the statute suggests a nondegradation policy128 that would 
require the government to forgo action that will reduce the current 
level of environmental quality. In certain cases, agencies are not 
only to avoid harming the environment but also are to improve and 
enhance the quality of the environment.129 Another concern of the 
statute is the preservation of "diversity and variety of individual 
choice."130 
These substantive duties are explicitly qualified by one limita-
tion. The government is to use "all practicable means consistent 
with other essential considerations of national policy" to achieve the 
section lOl(b) goals.131 However, the fact that the provision re-
quires reconciliation of environmental protection goals only with 
those national policy considerations deemed essential indicates that 
this qualification is not applicable in every situation. Unessential na-
tional policy considerations must yield to the environmental protec-
tion goals of NEP A.132 
To enforce these substantive obligations the courts have applied 
a two-pronged standard of review based on the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act. This standard was explained by the Supreme Court in 
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe. 133 The court on review 
must decide, first, whether the agency acted within the scope of its 
authority and, second, whether the ultimate decision reached was "ar-
bitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accord-
mit high standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities; and 
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum 
attainable recycling of depletable resources. 
126. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of the 
United States Army, 492 F.2d 1123, 1139 (5th Cir. 1974 ). 
127. See Robie; supra note 78, at 390. 
128. See 42 U.S.C. § 433l(b)(3) (1970). See also F. ANDERSON, supra note 5, 
at 265; Robie, supra note 78, at 390. 
129. See 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(4)-(6) (1970); Robie, supra note 78, at 390. 
130. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (4) (1970); see F. ANDERSON, supra note 5, at 265. 
131. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1970). 
132. See Cohen & Warren, supra note 107, at 694; Robie, supra note 78, at 412 
("this policy means that decisions must be made with the balance tipped in favor of 
environmental protection unless such action is not consistent with other essential con-
siderations of national policy") (emphasis original). 
133. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). Although Overton Park was not a NEPA case, it is 
frequently referred to by courts for guidance on the standard of review in NEPA 
cases. See Conservation Council v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664, 665 ( 4th Cir. 1973); 
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of the United States Army, 
470 F.2d 289, 300 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973), 
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ance with law."134 To decide whether the agency acted within the 
scope of its authority, the courts make a straightforward examination 
of the agency's statutory mission.135 In applying the less clear-cut 
arbitrary and capricious test in cases under NEPA, however, the 
courts must consider a number of factors. The inquiry focuses on 
whether the balance of environmental costs and economic and other 
benefits struck by the agency was justifiable.136 The courts must 
determine whether clearly insufficient weight was given to environ-
mental factors, 137 or whether the agency failed to consider all rel-
evant factors, such as possible alternatives or mitigation measures.138 
In essence, the courts must decide whether the decision itself "repre-
sented a clear error in judgment. "139 
As was true with procedural review,140 the precise meaning of 
the standard of review used for testing compliance with the substan-
tive requirements is unclear. The arbitrary and capricious standard 
is said to be a narrow one.141 The courts echo the Supreme Court 
statement in Overton Park that "[t]he court is not empowered to 
substitute its judgment for that of the agency,"142 and, generally, the 
courts have been quite restrained in reviewing agency actions on the 
merits.143 It seems the courts will not overturn an agency decision 
unless it was clearly made in complete disregard of the environmen-
tal consequences or was completely unjustifiable.144 That the 
134. 401 U.S. at 415-16. This test derives from the Administrative Procedure 
Act § lO(e) (B), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1970). The "scope of authority" test arises 
out of section 706(2)(B) & (C). The "arbitrary and capricious" test comes di-
rectly from section 706(2) (A). 
135. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of the 
United States Army, 470 F.2d 289, 300 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 
(1973 ). 
136. See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic En-
ergy Commn., 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Environmental Defense Fund, 
Inc. v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 353 (8th Cir. 1972). 
137. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 353 (8th 
Cir. 1972). 
138. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of the United 
States Army, 470 F.2d 289,300 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973). 
139. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of the United 
States Army, 470 F.2d 289, 300 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973). 
140. See text at notes 88-95 supra. 
141. See Citizens To Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1972). 
142. 401 U.S. at 416. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engi-
neers of the United States Army, 492 F.2d 1123, 1139 (5th Cir. 1974); Sierra Club 
v. Froehlke, 486 F.2d 946, 953 (7th Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. 
v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 353 (8th Cir. 1972). 
143. See Note, supra note 76, at 746 (observing that apparently every review on 
the merits of agency action for compliance with NEPA has permitted the agency to 
proceed). 
144. See Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 
122 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 529 (1974). 
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agency could have made a better decision is not sufficient to cause 
the courts to overturn the decision. 
For example, the district court in City of Romulus v. County of 
Wayne, 145 applying the arbitrary and capricious standard in a sub-
stantive review, upheld a decision to add an additional runway to 
Detroit's Metropolitan Airport. Among the allegations of the plain-
tiff were that the estimate of future air traffic demand was based 
on erroneous assumptions, that a better indicator of future demand 
existed, and that the computer predictions used were not by them-
selves accurate.146 The court said that it could not consider these 
claims because of the limited scope of its review.147 Having found 
a certain threshold level of rational decision-making, the court would 
not take up the question of whether it would be possible to get better 
information on which to base the decision.148 
Because of the limited nature of review for arbitrariness and ca-
priciousness, it seems evident that in most cases the result would be 
the same whether a court confined itself to demanding strict compli-
ance with NEPA procedures or also reviewed the agency decision 
for observance of substantive NEPA provisions. 149 However, ex-
treme cases of environmental harm can arise in which the outcome 
would hinge on whether or not substantive review was employed. 
These are exactly the cases in which judicial intervention is most 
needed to give effect to the environmental protection goals set by 
NEPA. Even though some commentators have felt the need for the 
application of a stricter standard of review, iGo substantive review 
using an arbitrary and capricious test is itself an important safeguard 
against violation of NEPA goals. 
Whether this same kind of judicial review should be applied not 
only to individual projects but to programs of which the projects are 
a part is an issue that has yet to be addressed by the courts. How-
ever, such a review seems fully appropriate. This Note has estab-
lished that only judicial review of compliance with the NEPA sub-
stantive provisions can insure that the environmental protection pol-
icy of the statute will be followed, particularly in those situations in 
which the environment is most endangered. The same statutory in-
terpretation that has led courts and commentators to approve sub-
stantive review of individual actions is applicable to programs. The 
courts have concluded that a program is a major federal action sig-
145. 392 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Mich. 1975). 
146. See 392 F. Supp. at 584, 587. 
147. See 392 F. Supp. at 587. 
148. See 392 F. Supp. at 587-89. 
149. See Robie, supra note 78, at 410. 
150. See Note, Tilting at the Environmental Windmill-The Quest for a Substan-
tive Right to a Clean Environment, 9 SuFFOLX: L. REV. 1286 (1975); Robie, supra 
note 78, at 436-37. 
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nificantly affecting the quality of the environment, and that, there-
fore, NEPA applies as much to a program as to a particular proj-
ect.151 Thus, programs should be subject to the requirements of the 
substantive provisions. 
Substantive review of both the program and the individual action 
is necessary to carry out NEPA. Although program and site-specific 
evaluations are required by the statute, the two types of impact state-
ments serve different functions.152 The program statement dis-
cusses the cumulative and synergistic effects of all the component 
individual actions while the site-specific statement deals with the en-
vironmental impact questions that are peculiar to one project. Even 
if all of the component actions individually have environmental ef-
fects that are acceptable in light of the NEPA substantive provisions, 
the total impact of the program may not be acceptable.158 There-
fore, if only the individual projects were subject to substantive judi-
cial review, there would be no way to ensure that the program as 
a whole satisfied the substantive requirements. 
Conversely, the fact that NEPA substantive standards are met 
by the program as a unit does not necessarily mean that each individ-
ual action also complies with the statute; the environmental deficien-
cies in a single project might not appear significant when considered 
as part of a body that otherwise consists of environmentally sound 
projects.154 Nonetheless, the statute requires agency compliance for 
every individual action. Such compliance cannot be secured unless 
each project is subject to substantive review. Because of the essen-
tially different purposes achieved by substantive judicial review of 
programs and of component projects, review of both program and 
project statements is necessary to carry out the policy of NEPA. 
ill. REMEDIBS FOR AGENCY NONCOMPLIANCE 
Once a court has decided that a program as well as a site-specific 
151. See text at notes 11-12 supra. 
152. See text at notes 63-70 supra. 
153. See text at note 14 supra. 
154. For example, the Scientists' Institute court required the Atomic Energy 
Commission to prepare a program statement for the development of the fast-breeder-
reactor. See text at notes 7-12 supra. Presumably, if the AEC ever succeeds in mak-
ing the fast-breeder-reactor suitable for commercial use, it will have to prepare impact 
statements for each individual reactor. This would force the AEC to discuss alterna-
tives to the proposed reactor and to specify precautions required to reduce as far as 
possible the environmental damage from the individual reactor. 
A second example involves the construction of a highway. A program statement 
is necessary for the entire highway, yet impact statements are also required for indi-
vidual projects such as a bridge or tunnel. In the case of a bridge, alternatives must 
be considered and the benefit derived from moving traffic from one side of a river 
to another must be balanced against the environmental damage resulting from con-
struction of the bridge. Of course predictions as to the amount of traffic that the ' 
bridge will carry would be based on the assumption that the entire highway has been 
constructed. 
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environmental evaluation is necessary and that the program compli-
ance is deficient, the question of what remedy is most appropriate 
under the policy of NEPA then arises. A common response of the 
courts in dealing with inadequate site-specific impact statements has 
been to enjoin further work on the project until there is compliance 
with NEPA. 155 Injunctive relief also has been used when an agency 
violated NEPA by not preparing a program impact statement.1116 As 
yet, no case has addressed the issue of remedies for a substantive 
violation of NEPA. 
This section of the Note first discusses when and to what extent 
injunctive relief should be granted for any NEPA violation. A pro-
cedure for determining the scope of program injunctions is then sug-
gested. Finally, the suggested procedure is applied to several ex-
amples. The immediate purpose of one type of injunctive relief, 
the preliminary injunction, is to maintain the existing situation until 
the dispute can be resolved at trial, 157 while that of the second type, 
the permanent injunction, 158 is to enforce the decision reached in 
court. However, the broad purpose of both preliminary and per-
manent injunctions in environmental cases is to prevent any action 
that would cause environmental damage from being taken in viola-
tion of NEPA. 
A judicial finding of a NEPA violation does not automatically 
result in the issuance of an injunction.159 In nonenvironmental 
cases, courts have ,traditionally held that the granting of an injunction 
,rests with the discretion of the trial court.16° Courts seem to exer-
cise a similar degree of discretion in NEPA cases.161 
155. See, e.g., Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244 
(10th Cir. 1973); People v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 811 (D. Hawaii 1973); Stop H-3 
Assn. v. Volpe, 349 F. Supp. 1047 (D. Hawaii 1972); Committee To Stop Route 7 v. 
Volpe, 346 F. Supp. 731 (D. Conn. 1972). 
156. See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 610 
(D.D.C. 1974); Society for Protection of New Hampshire Forests v •. Brinegar, 381 
F. Supp. 282 (D.N.H. 1974). 
151. See, e.g., City of Romulus v. County of Wayne, 392 F. Supp. 578, 595 (E.D. 
Mich. 1975). 
158. In the sense used he.re, a "permanent" injunction is not one that necessarily 
enjoins an activity indefinitely. The activity may only be enjoined until a specific 
condition is met, such as preparation of an impact statement or reconsideration of 
a decision. A permanent injunction is granted here as final relief after the plaintiff 
has prevailed on the merits at trial. 
159. See Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 358 F. Supp. 584, 
627 (D. Minn. 1973), affd., 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974); Committee To Stop 
Route 7 v. Volpe, 346 F. Supp. 731, 738 (D. Conn. 1972). 
160. See, e.g., Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Wirtz, 346 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1965); Gold-
ammer v. Fay, 326 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1964); Morris v. Williams, 149 F.2d 703, 
709 (8th Cir. 1945). 
161. See Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 358 F. Supp. 584, 
627 (D. Minn. 1973), affd., 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974); Committee To Stop 
Route 7 v. Volpe, 346 F. Supp. 731, 738 (D. Conn. 1972). 
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In deciding whether to grant preliminary injunctive relief in 
NEPA cases, the courts have generally relied on an analysis that is 
similar to that used in nonenvironmental cases.182 Traditionally, in 
equity, a plaintiff's case must satisfy three basic requirements: It 
must demonstrate a probability of success on the merits; it must 
make a showing of irreparable harm; and it must establish that the 
balance of equities favors the injunction.183 These requirements are 
somewhat modified when they are applied in environmental cases. 
The first factor to be considered is whether the plaintiff has 
shown a probability of success on the merits.184 Before issuing a 
preliminary injunction, the purpose of which is to preserve the status 
quo, 165 the courts try to foresee the final resolution of the case. They 
do this to avoid the inconvenience to the defendant that may result 
from a court-ordered freezing of the situation carried out in favor 
of an ultimately unsuccessful claimant. 
A second factor courts consider before granting a preliminary in-
junction is whether the danger of irreparable harm exists. The tra-
ditional requirement of equity cases is that the plaintiff must show 
that he himself will suffer such harm unless an injunction is 
granted.186 Although this language has been used in some NEPA 
cases, 167 the courts have not actually applied the traditional irrep-
arable injury test.168 Instead, the word "irreparable" has been 
given a "broad and expansive meaning."169 Although the courts 
say that they are evaluating the potential harm to the plaintiffs, 
they are, in fact, concerned with the amount of harm to the en-
vironment that will result if no preliminary injunction is issued. 
162. See City of Romulus v. County of Wayne, 392 F. Supp. 578, 594 (E.D. 
Mich. 1975). However, one traditional element of equitable relief that is often ig-
nored or assumed to be satisfied in the review of administrative action is the require-
ment that there be no adequate remedy at law. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
Tmcr 444 (1959). 
163. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Federal Energy Office, 380 F. Supp. 560 
(D.D.C. 1974), affd., 520 F.2d 1339 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
164. See Steubing v. Brinegar, 511 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1975); City of Romulus 
v. County of Wayne, 392 F. Supp. 578, 594-95 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Minnesota Pub. 
Interest Research Group v. Butz, 358 F. Supp. 584, 625 (D. Minn. 1973), affd., 498 
F.2d 1314.(Stb Cir. 1974). 
165. See, e.g., City of Romulus v. County of Wayne, 392 F. Supp. 578, 595 (E.D. 
Mich. 1975). 
166. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Irie. v. Federal Energy Office, 380 F. Supp. 
560 (D.D.C. 1974), affd., 520 F.2d 1339 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
167. See, e.g., Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 358 F. Supp. 
584, 625 (D. Minn. 1973), affd., 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974). 
168. See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 610, 624 
(D.D.C. 1974); Society for Protection of New Hampshire Forests v. Brinegar, 381 
F. Supp. 282, 283 (D.N.H. 1974). 
169. See, e.g., Society for Protection of New Hampshire Forests v. Brinegar, 381 
F. Supp. 282, 283 (D.N.H. 1974). 
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For example, in Steubing v. Brinegar,11° the court upheld the 
grant of a preliminary injunction partly because the plaintiffs had 
shown that the construction of the bridge in question would per-
manently scar one of New York State's most beautiful lakes.171 
Thus, even though the courts have used the language of the tradi-
tional equity formula in granting a preliminary injunction, their basic 
purpose, once a probability of success on the merits is shown, is to 
make certain that no significant damage to the environment occurs 
before a final decision can be reached in the case. 172 
While the courts have not applied the irreparable harm analysis 
in the traditional sense, they generally do accede to the third require-
ment noted above-the traditional practice of balancing the interests 
involved.173 The evaluation of the public interest is normally treated 
as a separate factor in nonenvironmental cases.174 In their formula-
tion of the criteria for granting a preliminary injunction, the courts 
deciding environmental cases have maintained the distinction be-
tween the public interest and the parties' interests.175 However, the 
theoretical distinction tends to disappear when the formula is ap-
plied, since the balancing in reality becomes one of the public inter-
ests in continuing the activity against the public interest in environ-
mental protection. 
In any given case the public interest considerations may lead to 
contradictory results. For example, in Minnesota Public Interest 
Research Group v. Butz,116 the court observed that two separate 
public interests had to be weighed in a suit to prevent logging in 
the Boundary Waters Canoe Area in Minnesota. Primary was the 
interest, declared by Congress in the Wilderness Act,177 in preserv-
110. 511 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1975). 
171. 511 F.2d at 496. Consider also Society for Protection of New Hampshire 
Forests v. Brinegar, 381 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.H. 1974), in which the court consid-
ered as irreparable injury to the plaintiffs the long-term effects on a "small, unique 
area of incomparable beauty" of future automobile traffic on a proposed superhigh-
way. 381 F. Supp. at 283. However, in Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group 
v. Butz, 358 F. Supp. 584 (D. Minn. 1973), affd., 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974), 
the court followed the traditional analysis of irreparable injury to the plaintiff. 
112. Cf. City of Romulus v. County of Wayne, 392 F. Supp. 578, 596 (E.D. 
Mich. 1975). 
173. See City of Romulus v. County of Wayne, 392 F. Supp. 578, 594 (E.D. 
Mich. 1975); Society for Protection of New Hampshire Forests v, Brinegar, 381 F. 
Supp. 282,283 (D.N.H. 1974). 
114. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Federal Energy Office, 380 F. Supp. 
560 (D.D.C. 1974), affd., 520 F.2d 1339 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
115. See City of Ron:mlus v. County of Wayne, 392 F. Supp. 578, 594 (E.D. 
Mich. 1975); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp, 610, 624 
(D.D.C. 1974); Society for Protection of New Hampshire Forests v. Brinegar, 381 
F. Supp. 282 (D.N.H. 1974); Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 358 
F. Supp. 584, 625 (D. Minn. 1973), affd., 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974). 
176. 358 F. Supp. 584 (D. Minn. 1973), affd., 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974). 
177. 16 u.s.c. § 1131-36 (1970). 
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ing such areas in their primitive states. A-second public interest lay 
in the economic value of the employment and income that would 
be generated by the logging. The Minnesota court found the wil-
derness preservation interest to be overwhelming because it was an 
interest declared by Congress and because the timber industry in 
Minnesota had opportunities for logging elsewhere.178 
On the other hand, in The Committee for Nuclear Responsibility 
v. Seeborg,179 in which the plaintiff sought to halt the Project Can-
nikan nuclear test explosion, the court found that the public interest 
required that no preliminary injunction be issued. Even though the 
court thought that the failure to produce an impact statement was 
probably a violation of NEPA, 180 it determined that the overriding 
national security interest required that the test take place on sched-
ule.1s1 
There are a small number of cases in which the courts have devi-
ated from the usual practice and refused to consider the equities in-
volved when deciding whether to grant an injunction, either prelim-
inary or permanent.182 These cases have relied on an absolute rule 
that courts should issue an injunction without looking to the tradi-
tional requirements of equitable relief when a federal statute has 
been violated183 and when, in the case of a preliminary injunction, 
a probability of success on the merits and a likelihood of irreparable 
harm have also been shown.184 These courts reason that if the pol-
icy behind an important federal statute is not being followed, an in-
junction should be granted to enforce that policy.185 Because 
178. 358 F. Supp. at 626. 
179. 463 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir.), application for injunction in aid of jurisdiction 
denied, 404 U.S. 917 (1971). 
180. See 463 F.2d at 797-98. 
181. See 463 F.2d at 798. The government claimed that because of numerous 
technical factors, conditions would not again be right for the test for at least one 
year. Among the consequences of such a delay would be the disruption of the Safe-
guard Anti-Ballistic Missile program, which in tum, it was argued, would jeopardize 
the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. 
182. See Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1971); Atchison, Topeka & 
Santa Fe Ry. v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 610 (D.D.C. 1974). 
183. See Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111, 1116 (9th Cir. 1971). 
184. See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 610, 623 
(D.D.C. 1974). 
185. The courts in Lathan and Atchison relied on United States v. City and 
County of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16 (1940). The City of San Francisco had vio-
lated federal law by selling power to a utility company instead of distributing it di-
rectly to the public. In prohibiting the city from continuing this practice, the Court 
rejected the argument that a balancing of equities would weigh against an injunction: 
"The equitable doctrines relied on do not militate against the capacity of a court of 
equity as a proper forum in which to make a declared policy of Congress effective. 
Injunction to prohibit continued . . . violation of that policy . . . is both appropriate 
and necessary." 310 U.S. at 31. 
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environmentally based decisions can have tremendous economic 
consequences, this approach seems unjustifiably inflexible.186 
In deciding whether to grant a permanent injunction, the courts 
generally consider some of the same factors that are used to deter-
mine whether a preliminary injunction is appropriate, but no definite 
list of considerations is consistently used. The majority of courts en-
gage in a balancing of interests that is similar to the process involved 
in the consideration of a preliminary injunction.187 For these courts, 
the conclusion that NEPA has been violated does not automatically 
result in the issuance of a permanent injunction. 188 Instead, they 
generally adopt the position that if NEPA has been violated, there 
is a presumption that injunctive relief should be granted. Unlike 
the preliminary injunction situation where the burden is on the plain-
tiff to demonstrate that an injunction is necessary, the burden here 
is upon the government agency to persuade the court not to issue 
an injunction.189 
The consideration of the public interest is one of the most impor-
tant factors in the granting or denying of a permanent injunction. 
The courts recognize that concern for the public interest in the pres-
ervation of the environment is proclaimed by the statute itself100 and 
that it is this interest that plaintiffs may seek to protect.101 In com-
petition with this interest may be other matters of public concern 
such as traffic safety and the needs of the motoring public,102 or the 
protection of jobs193 that may be furthered by a continuation of the 
environmentally harmful activity. It is, of course, a difficult task to 
186. See text at notes 215-23 infra. 
187. See, e.g., Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 358 F. Supp. 
584 (D. Minn. 1973), affd., 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974); Committee To Stop 
Route 7 v. Volpe, 346 F. Supp. 731, 738 (D. Conn. 1972). 
188. See Committee To Stop Route 7 v. Volpe, 346 F. Supp. 731, 738 (D. Conn. 
1972). 
189. See, e.g., Committee To Stop Route 7 v. Volpe, 346 F. Supp. 731, 738 (D. 
Conn. 1972) ("But where an important provision of federal law has not been com-
plied with, the burden should be upon those urging that noncompliance should be 
excused"). 
190. See NEPA§ 101(c), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(c) (1970): "The Congress recog-
nizes that each person should enjoy a healthful environment and that each person 
has a responsibility to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the environ-
ment." 
191. See Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244, 1250 
( 10th Cir. 1973). 
192. See Vermont Natural Resources Council, Inc. v. Brinegar, 508 F.2d 927, 937 
(2d Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 423 U.S. 809 (1975); Arkansas Community 
Organization for Reform Now v. Brinegar, 398 F. Supp. 685, 699 (E.D. Ark. 1975), 
affd. sub. nom. Arkansas Community Organization for Reform Now v. Coleman, 531 
F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1976). 
193. See Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 358 F. Supp. 584, 
626 (D. Minn. 1973), aftd., 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974). 
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reconcile these conflicting public interests in any particular case.194 
In addition to those elements that are common both to prelim-
inary and permanent injunctive relief, courts are willing to consider 
numerous factors in deciding whether to grant a permanent injunc-
tion. These have included the stage of completion of the project, 195 
the plaintiffs' delay in bringing suit, and the relative significance of 
the environmental impact.196 
In several cases, courts have pointed out the need to consider 
the likelihood that an agency action will actually be modified or 
abandoned if all the procedural requirements of NEPA are met.197 
In Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz,198 for exam-
ple, the plaintiff sought to enjoin certain logging operations until the 
Forest Service prepared an environmental impact statement. In de-
ciding whether to grant a permanent injunction, the court said it was 
necessary to determine the probability that the Forest Service could 
be persuaded to ban all logging.199 On the facts of this particular 
case, the court decided that such a ban was likely.200 It acknowl-
edged, however, that if there were only a slight chance that the gov-
ernment would prohibit logging, an injunction would not be appro-
priate. 201 
The fallacy of this approach is that until the necessary informa-
tion is compiled by the agency, courts cannot predict the agency re-
sponse; the court does not know what the new data will be. The 
varieties of environmental effects and the possible alternatives to 
mitigate these effects are too numerous for a court to engage in spec-
ulation about agency response. 
Even if the agency has given some consideration to environmen-
tal factors without going through the impact statements process, it will 
not have been confronted with all pertinent information. After all, 
an essential purpose of the impact statement is to make public the 
environmental effects and to invite public comment on the potential 
consequences of a planned agency activity. 202 The plaintiff, of 
course, cannot be expected to present all the objections that would 
have been made by concerned members of the public had the agency 
194. See text at notes 176-81 supra. 
195. See Committee To Stop Route 7 v. Volpe; 346 F. Supp. 731, 738 (D. Conn. 
1972). 
196. See Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 358 F. Supp. 584, 
627 (D. Minn. 1973), affd., 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974). 
197. See, e.g., Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 358 F. Supp. 
584,625 (D. Minn. 1973), affd., 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974). 
198. 358 F. Supp. 584 (D. Minn. 1973), affd., 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974). 
199. 358 F. Supp. at 625. 
200. 358 F. Supp. at 625. 
201. 358 F. Supp. at 625. 
202. See note 62 supra & text at notes 61-62 supra. 
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sought public comment. Without this public comment and the addi-
tional pressure that may be generated upon the agency to prepare 
a thorough report, there is no way the court can be certain that all 
relevant data is available. Hence, any prediction as to the probable 
agency response will necessarily be defective. 
An additional purpose of NEPA is to force agencies to integrate 
environmental considerations into their decision-making pro-
cesses. 203 Enjoining a particular activity until all environmental fac-
tors are properly considered will not only compel agency compliance 
in that particular case but will also place all agencies on notice that 
the courts intend to enforce NEPA requirements effectively. The 
threat of injunction may very well be the only judicial tool that is 
capable of stimulating agencies to comply with this requirement in 
every case and not just in those cases where the agency believes the 
environmental impact will not alter its ultimate decision. 
The decision to grant injunctive relief is only the first step, for 
the court must also determine the scope of the injunction. 204 In the 
case of individual projects, the courts have not limited themselves 
to the granting or denying of a total injunction but instead have been 
persuaded in particular cases to enjoin only parts of the project ac-
tivity. 205 An example of such a partial injunction is Arkansas Com-
munity Organization for Reform Now v. Brinegar.206 The suit was 
brought by a group seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to halt 
the construction of an interstate highway through the city of Little 
Rock. The court found inadequate the discussion in the impact 
statement of possible alternatives and modifications to the project. 
It thereupon enjoined work on the highway east of a certain point 
but allowed work on the road west of that point to proceed. 207 In 
reaching this decision the court gave great weight to the fact that 
a new hospital, one of only two in the city providing emergency serv-
ice, was located along the route of the highway and that there was 
a need for rapid access to this facility. 208 The court was also influ-
enced by the need of the public for an expressway in the western 
part of the city.209 
203. See text at notes 57-59 supra. 
204. Of course, deciding to grant an injunction may very well involve some deter-
mination as to the scope of that injunction. These two steps may not always be dis-
tinct and the ability to frame an effective and reasonable injunction may be a factor 
in deciding whether it should be granted. 
205. See Arkansas Community Organization for Reform Now v. Brinegar, 398 F. 
Supp. 685 (E.D. Ark. 1975), affd. sub. nom. Arkansas Community Organization for 
Reform Now v. Coleman, 531 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1976). Cf. Developments in the 
Law-Injunctions, 78 HARV. L REV. 994, 1065 (1965). 
206. 398 F. Supp. 685 (E.D. Ark. 1975), affd. sub. nom. Arkansas Community 
Organization for Reform Now v. Coleman, 531 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1976). 
207. 398 F. Supp. at 699. 
208. 398 F. Supp. at 699. 
209. 398 F. Supp. at 699. 
November 1976] Program Environmental Impact Statements 139 
Any judicial decision that allows continuation of a portion of a 
project lacking an environmental impact statement warrants criti-
cism; no agency should be permitted to proceed where environmen-
tal impacts are unknown. Yet it is likely that courts will continue 
to allow portions of an activity to continue where the court perceives ' 
a high need for these portions to be completed and a low probability 
of unacceptable environmental harm. These courts should at least 
recognize the dangers inherent in this approach and allow exceptions 
to an injunction only in exceptionally clear cases. Partial injunctive 
relief is especially applicable to cases involving programs, which by 
definition consist of many individual actions. The power of the 
courts to enjoin all or part of a government action when a NEPA 
violation is found would apply both to individual projects and to pro-
grams because a program is itself an action. In theory the courts 
could use the same approach in granting equitable relief in program 
cases as they use in cases involving individual projects. However, 
whether a court should as a rule grant a total injunction against the 
program or whether it should limit the scope of the injunction by a 
consideration of the facts of a particular case depends upon the nature 
of the violations the injunction is designed to remedy. 
If the procedural requirements of NEPA have been satisfied and 
if, after reviewing the merits of an agency action, the court concludes 
that the program as proposed will violate the substantive require-
ments of NEPA, it must enjoin the entire program to prevent viola-
tions of the statute. In such a case it is the program itself, not the 
procedures used in its planning, that is violative of NEPA.210 
The considerations involved are different when there is a viola-
tion of NEPA procedural requirements. An agency is required by 
NEPA to obtain information on the environmental effects of and al-
ternatives to a proposed action and to consider this information when 
making a decision on that proposal. 211 When compliance with the 
procedural requirements has been found wanting, no decision can 
be made on whether the program itself violates the NEPA substan-
tive standards. This second decision will come, if the issue is raised, 
only after the program decision-making procedures have been fol-
lowed and the necessary information to make such a decision is avail-
able. 
Since the information needed to assess the environmental im-
210. Even if the entire program were enjoined, an agency would be free to pro-
pose certain program components as individual actions. However, the actions must 
be completely independent of the enjoined program. The principles that determine 
whether groups of actions require a program statement would be applied to determine 
whether the individual actions constitute a new program or are to be deemed the same 
program. See text at notes 7-56 supra. 
211. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970), as amended by 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(2)(D)-(I) 
(Supp. 1976). 
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pacts of the program is not available, there are several dangers in 
allowing an agency to proceed with the proposed program. The 
most important danger is that the agency may blindly engage in an 
activity that causes substantial and irreparable damage to the envi-
ronment. Even if such harm does not directly result, the agency 
may become so committed to the program that it cannot modify or 
abandon it even if it eventually discovers that the environmental 
costs of proceeding are great. 212 Another hazard is that the contin-
ued government activity increases the agency's investment in the 
program and thereby alters the balance of costs and benefits to favor 
completion.213 Because of these dangers some courts have enjoined 
all component activities of a program found to be in violation of 
NEPA procedural requirements. 214 These courts consider all activi-
ties that have as a primary purpose the advancement of the program 
to be program components. 215 Such a total injunction would prevent 
the government from making additional commitments that might 
preclude a meaningful and unprejudiced agency decision in the fu-
ture on the merits of the program. 
Completely enjoining a large, complex program, however, is 
likely to result in considerable expense to both government and the 
private parties involved because of lost work time, increases in con-
struction costs, and damages for various breaches of contract. Since 
one of the factors that determines the desirability of an injunction 
is the balance of interests among the public and private parties, an 
increase in program expense will shift the balance toward the with-
holding of injunctive relief. However, two factors militate against 
attaching too much weight to this increase. First, it is certainly cor-
rect that "[d]elay is a concomitant of the implementation of the 
procedures prescribed by NEP A,"216 and, therefore, that increases 
212. For example, in Scientists' Institute for Pub. Information, Inc. v. Atomic 
Energy Commn., 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973 ), the court held that the env1-
ronmental effects of the entire breeder-reactor-program had to be considered at the 
outset because, by the time the breeder-reactor-technology will have become opera-
tional, there would be a need for a new method of energy production, and because, 
since only the breeder reactor will have been perfected, the government would have 
no choice but to use it whatever the environmental costs. 
213. See, e.g., Society for Protection of New Hampshire Forests v. Brinegar, 381 
'F. Supp. 282 (D.N.H. 1974); text at notes 18-23 supra,· cf. Atchison, Topeka & Santa 
Fe Ry. v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 610 (D.D.C. 1974). 
214. See, e.g., People v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 811 (D. Hawaii 1973); Stop H-3 
Assn. v. Volpe, 349 F. Supp. 1047 (D. Hawaii 1972) (enjoining design and construc-
tion of a highway because even continuing the design work alone involved a signifi-
cant expenditure of money that would increase the government stake in building the 
highway as planned). 
215. See People v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 811, 821 (D. Hawaii 1973); Stop H-3 
Assn. v. Volpe, 349 F. Supp. 1047, 1048 (D. Hawaii 1972). 
216. Greene County Planning Bd. v. Federal Power Commn., 455 F.2d 412, 422 
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972); Society for Protection of New Hamp-
shire Forests v. Brinegar, 381 F. Supp. 282, 289 (D.N.H. 1974). 
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in cost resulting from a delay necessary to achieve the goals of NEPA 
should not dissuade a court from enjoining an activity to prevent en-
vironmental damage that may later prove too costly to correct. 217 
Second, it must be remembered that the sole cause of the delay is 
the agency failure to comply with the requirements of NEPA. As 
was mentioned above, 218 prohibiting an agency from continuing an 
activity in violation of NEPA may be the only judicial remedy that 
will force agencies to consider adequately environmental impacts 
during the initial decision-making process. 
Nonetheless, the costs associated with a delay may be so substan-
tial relative to the anticipated environmental harm that a complete 
injunction is unwarranted. In such a case it would seem appropriate 
for a court to exclude from the scope of the injunction any program 
component that does not substantially compromise the environmental 
safeguards of NEPA. The touchstone in determining which com-
ponents of the program should be excluded is whether proceeding 
with a component would likely preclude a meaningful decision on 
implementation of the program itself after a full consideration of the 
program environmental impact. 219 Even a component that in itself 
causes no environmental harm may so shift the balance in favor of. 
program completion that it should not be allowed to proceed. 220 
An excellent example of the proper exclusion of a particular 
project from a program injunction is Society for Protection of New 
Hampshire Forests v. Brinegar.221 In this case the court found a 
violation of NEPA in the agency's failure to prepare a comprehen-
sive impact statement for the entire proposed route of an interstate 
highway. Included in the work planned for the immediate future 
was the construction of twin bridges that were designed to replace 
a single bridge that was in a dangerous state of disrepair and to ex-
pand its capacity to accommodate the planned highway.222 The 
court enjoined all work on the highway except the construction of 
one of the planned twin bridges. 228 
217. See Greene County Planning Bd. v. Federal Power Commn., 455 F.2d 412, 
422 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating 
Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Commn., 449 F.2d 1109, 1128 (D.C. 
Cir. 1971). 
218. See text at note 203 supra. 
219. See People v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 811,821 (D. Hawaii 1973). 
220. See People v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 811, 821 (D. Hawaii 1973) ("Work al-
lowed to proceed because it does not have a specific environmental impact would in-
crease the government's 'stake' in the project and thereby influence the decision • 
making process when it is time to reevaluate the project in light of the environmental 
considerations"); Stop H-3 Assn. v. Volpe, 349 F. Supp. 1047 (D. Hawaii 1972). 
221. 381 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.H. 19}4). 
222. 381 F. Supp. at 288. 
223. 381 F. Supp. at 289-90. 
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Because of the dangerous state of the existing bridge, the court 
recognized that it was likely that a new bridge would be needed even 
if the proposed interstate highway were never constructed. 224 Thus, 
the government would not suffer any loss on account of the bridge 
if the program were abandoned and hence, the bridge's construction 
would not change the balance of the competing interests to favor 
the completion of the program. This exception made by the New 
Hampshire Forests court was an extremely narrow one. Although 
the twin bridges were planned as a part of a program, one was al-
lowed to be constructed because it was a necessary project when con-
sidered alone. The other, even though its direct environmental im-
pact would apparently have been acceptable, was enjoined because 
it was not necessary apart from the highway program and thereby 
represented an additional commitment to the implementation of that 
program. 
Because the agency in New Hampshire Forests apparently ar-
gued for only a small number of exceptions to the injunction, 225 the 
court was able to consider directly and to rule upon each request. 
However, even a program such as the building of a highway involves 
an infinite number of component parts that arguably could be con-
tinued without diminishing the protection of the environment. Had 
the agency chosen to request exemption for a large number of in-
dividual actions, the hearing on the remedy would have been ex-
tremely time-consuming. Thus, if courts are efficiently to consider 
possible exceptions to a program injunction, they need to use a pro-
cedure that removes the court from the process of considering every 
program component for which an exemption is requested. 226 
To accomplish an efficient review where many exceptions to the 
injunction are sought, the court should enjoin all work on all program 
components and order the agency involved to set up a review proce-
dure to determine whether any particular component parts should 
be allowed to proceed. Under such a review procedure, the agency 
should first assess the environmental impact of the activity and make 
a preliminary decision on whether it ought to proceed. The agency 
should then inform the plaintiffs and other interested people of this 
preliminary decision; these parties could respond to the agency, 
which in turn might modify its preliminary decision as it deemed nec-
essary. 
224. 381 F. Supp. at 288-89. 
225. See 381 F. Supp. at 288-89. The court also heard arguments, which it re• 
jected, that the government be allowed to proceed with land acquisition. 
226. Of course, if the agency wishes only to obtain an exemption for a small 
number of activities, the court could easily decide the issue at trial. The procedure 
this Note proposes would only be helpful in the case of a complex program in which 
there were many activities that the agency desired to continue pending fu11 NEPA 
compliance. 
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If the plaintiffs or third parties227 are not satisfied that the f~al 
agency decision was consonant with the purpose of the injunction, 
they could resolve the matter in the district court, which would have 
retained jurisdiction. However, even if there is no opposition to 
the agency determination, the district court must still review the 
agency decision on its merits. Only when the court has accepted 
the decision that the continuation of a particular project will not 
thwart the purposes of the injunction should the exception be al-
lowed. 228 
The injunction ought to set the standards by which the agency 
is to make its decision. In deciding whether a particular action may 
proceed without violating the purpose of the injunction, the agency 
should consider the following factors: 
(1) whether continuation of the individual activity will itself 
result in a significant, adverse environmental impact; the nature and 
extent of any impact; and whether the environmental damage could 
be repaired at a reasonable cost if the project Were modified or 
abandoned as a result of complete NEPA program comP.liance; 
(2) whether continued work on the individual activity pending 
NEPA compliance would physically foreclose subsequent adoption 
of alternatives that might be dictated by the completed NEPA re-
view; 
(3) the effect o~ delay upon the varying public interests;229 and 
(4) whether the additional commitment of resources might 
preclude a meaningful decision reached on the NEPA review by 
227. The district court may, in its discretion, allow third parties to intervene to 
contest the agency decision. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b). 
228. The interim review process established by the Atomic Energy Commission 
in response to Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic En-
ergy Commn., 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), provides a model for the suggested 
procedure. The AEC granted construction permits for nuclear reactors before the 
enactment of NEPA. With the enactment of NEPA, the AEC began to conduct 
NEPA reviews for nuclear reactors only in the event an operating license was re-
quested. Calvert Clitf s' held this procedure inadequate under NEPA because con-
struction on nuclear reactors continued without environmental consequences having 
been considered. 449 F.2d at 1128-29. The AEC established an intei:im procedure 
to determine whether construction permits should be suspended pending completion 
of the required NEPA review. 10 C.F.R. Part 50, app. D, 1[ E (1972). For 
a discussion of the substantive standards to be applied by the AEC in making this 
determination, see note 230 infra & text at notes 229-30 infra. 
Under the AEC procedure, within thirty days of the required publication in the 
Federal Register of any AEC determination, any person other than the licensee could 
request a hearing concerning the determination. Hearings would be held pursuant 
to such requests at the discretion of the AEC. 10 C.F.R. Part 50, app. D, 
1[ E.4 (1972). The procedure suggested by this Note would provide interested parties 
an opportunity to comment without going through a formal process of requesting a 
hearing, which the agency might refuse to grant. This change will both insure that 
the agency takes account of objections to its decision and expedite the process by 
making it less formal. 
229. See text at notes 190-94 supra. 
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shifting the balance among benefits, costs and environmental im-
pacts. 2ao 
The final consideration is the heart of the interim review process. 
If the continuation of an individual activity will commit the agency 
to the program or if it will preclude certain options so that the agency 
is not as free to modify its plans as it was before the action was taken, 
that action should be enjoined until there is compliance with the 
NEPA procedures. As the following examples will demonstrate, the 
number of activities that the review process should exempt will nor-
mally be small. 
Had the interim review process been used in New Hampshire 
Forests,231 the result achieved in that case would not have been dis-
turbed. The following conclusions are reached upon application of 
the four criteria: (1) The court apparently was satisfied that the en-
vironmental impact caused by the construction of the single bridge 
was within acceptable limits; however the environmental damage 
would be permanent and not subject to repair if the highway were 
modified or abandoned; (2) The building of this one bridge did not 
physically prevent the government from rerouting the highway; (3) 
Because the existing bridge was in a dangerous condition of disre-
pair, there was a current public need for a new bridge; (4) Because 
of the public need for a new bridge, the single bridge would not 
be wasted even if the highway program were abandoned, nor would 
the construction shift the balance of interests in favor of the proposed 
program. A consideration of these four factors shows that allowing 
the construction of the bridge to proceed would not impair the en-
forcement of NEPA. 
However, in New Hampshire Forests the government also asked 
that it be permitted to acquire land for other parts of the highway 
program even though it was enjoined from constructing the high-
way. 232 Application of the interim review standards in this case 
leads to these conclusions: (1) The environmental impact of the pur-
chases of the land would probably be slight and any impact caused 
by mere government ownership could be reversed by the sale of the 
230. The procedure established by the AEC for interim review of continued con-
struction of nuclear reactors pending complete NEPA review, see note 228 supra, in-
cluded the first three factors. See 10 C.F.R. Part SO, app. D, ,r E.2 (1972). 
However, in approving the consideration of these three factors, the court in Coalition 
for Safe Nuclear Pow~r v. United States Atomic Energy Commn., 463 F.2d 954, 
956 (D.C. Cir. 1972), added the final element, which it declared to be the most im-
portant. For similar standards for interim review of ABC projects made necessary 
by NEPA, see 38 Fed. Reg. 19853, 19854 (1973); 39 Fed. Reg. 11326, 11327 
(1974). 
231. 381 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.H. 1974). For a discussion of the facts of this case, 
see text at notes 221-25 supra. For the purposes of this example, it is necessary to 
assume that a permanent rather than a preliminary injunction is being granted. 
232. See 381 F. Supp. at 288-89. 
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land if the government were willing to do so;233 (2) Because it would 
be possible for the government to buy new land elsewhere for the 
highway or to develop other means of transportation, acquiring the 
land would not physically foreclose the adoption of alternatives that 
might be dictated by the complete NEPA review; (3) The delay 
might increase land costs because of inflation, but, since this effect 
would be present in all aspects bf the program, there is no reason 
to give special weight to the cost of inflation when considering land 
acquisition; (4) The acquisition of land would affect the ultimate de-
cision on· the program because the time and money invested by the 
government would increase the cost of abandoning or modifying the 
program.234 Because the final decision to a certain extent depends 
on a balancing of the costs and benefits of proceeding with the pro-
gram, increasing the cost of abandonment or modification would 
make proceeding with the program increasingly more attractive rela-
tive to any altemative.285 Therefore, the government's land acquisi-
tion should not be exempted from the program injunction. This was 
the result that the district court reached in the actual case. 236 
233. There are numerous instances in which the purchase and resale of land could 
cause environmental harm. For example, if the land were taken by condemnation 
from private owners who were protecting its environmental quality and who, upon 
modification of the highway program, sold to someone who would create an adverse 
environmental impact, the net environmental effect would be significant. In New 
Hampshire Forests, there was no indication from whom the land would be acquired. 
234. See Coalition for Safe Nuclear Power v. United States Atomic Energy 
Commn., 463 F.2d 954, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
It might be argued that the government could resell the land if it decided to re-
route the highway and, thus, could eliminate any cost incurred in abandoning the pro-
gram due to prior land acquisition. However, it is not clear that the government 
could always recover all of the money it had spent in acquiring the land. The value 
of the land might drop when it is learned that the land is not needed for the highway. 
Also, the cost of selecting the proper land and negotiating the sale would not be re-
coverable. 
235. See Coalition for Safe Nuclear Power v. United States Atomic Energy 
Commn., 463 F.2d 954, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
236. 381 F. Supp. at 282. 
In Cady v. Morton, 527 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1975), the court dealt with the effect 
of allowing individual actions on future decisions concerning whole programs. 
It ordered that the ultimate decision on whether to proceed with the program 
must be made without regard for any commitments resulting from the individual ac-
tion. The program in Cady consisted of a lease by the Crow Indians, approved by 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs, of Indian-owned mineral rights to nearly 31,000 acres 
of land. No environmental impact statement was made before the making of the 
lease. The individual action in Cady was the private lessee's mining plan for 770 acres 
of the 31,000 acres covered by the lease, and the lessee's subsequent contracts agree-
ing to supply utilities with such large amounts of coal that fulfilling the contracts 
would necessarily require mining a large portion of the 31,000 acres. The Bureau 
of Indian affairs had issued an environmental impact statement concerning solely the 
lessee's plan for 770 acres. When this statement was challenged, the Cady court or-
dered the government to prepare a program impact statement concerning the entire 
lease of land. The order included the condition, however, that once the statement 
was prepared, the government would have to make its decision as to approval of the 
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The characteristic that distinguishes the land acquisition from the 
building of the bridge in New Hampshire Forests is that the bridge 
construction is severable from the total program while the land ac-
quisition is not. In other words, the bridge would be constructed 
even if there were no highway program, but there would be no land 
acquisition in the absence of the program. In cases where the pri-
mary concern is to prevent additional government investments from 
altering the balance of costs and benefits, those projects that can be 
said to be severable from the program will be most properly ex-
empted from the injunction by this process of interim review. 
In other cases, however, even an action that is severable may 
not qualify for an exemption. Consider, for example, a case in 
which the component activities of the program are so geographically 
related that only a limited number of projects can be put into effect 
without creating an unacceptable environmental impact. 237 The 
purpose of the program statement in such a case is to determine the 
point at which the cumulative effects would become unacceptable 
and to identify those projects that would most fully accomplish the 
agency goal with the least damage to the environment. Because of 
the geographical limit on the total number of projects, a commitment 
to one project necessarily means that certain other projects may not 
be undertaken. Without a comprehensive environmental evalua-
tion, it is possible that the best projects, in terms of accomplishing 
the agency goal with the least environmental cost, would not be in-
cluded in the limited number allowable because another project was 
begun first. Consequently, approval of a single activity would be 
counter to the fourth criterion, which requires that a meaningful pro-
gram decision not be precluded, and thus, no activity should be ex-
empted from the program injunction. 
Following the above procedure in determining the scope of in-
junctive relief will save considerable court time by shifting the re-
entire lease without regard for the commitments entered into by the lessee. 527 F.2d 
at 798. 
If the added investment created by work done before there is program compliance 
is actually disregarded, the type of injunction issued in Cady would accomplish the 
purpose of preserving the possibility of a meaningful decision on whether to continue 
with the program. However, such disregard by the government might have been pos-
sible in Cady only because the investment to be disregarded was made by private par-
ties, not by the government. In cases where the investment would be made by the 
government, it seems unlikely that an agency could disregard the time and money 
committed to the program prior to an environmental analysis. Presumably, no agency 
would want to be accused by the public or by governmental budget administrators 
of wasting money by investing in projects that later were abandoned. 
237. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit be-
lieved that such a program existed in Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 
1975). The Supreme Court, however, reversed the Court of Appeals by holding that 
there was no program of geographically related projects. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 96 
s. Ct. 2718 (197.6) .. 
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sponsibility for the initial decision on each action to the agency. 
Moreover, because an agency need not present to the court argu-
ments on each project it desires to be exempted, the agency does 
not have to determine by the time of the trial activities with which 
it might possibly want _to proceed should an injunction be granted. 
As the need arises, the agency can begin the review process for any 
particular program components. 
Significantly, placing the responsibility on the agency for making 
the initial determination on exempting components from the injunc-
tion is consistent with the scheme of the NEPA procedural require-
ments that places the initial responsibility for decision-making upon 
the agency itself. 288 At the same time, the district court, by retain-
ing jurisdiction, will be in a position to review directly the interim 
agency determination. Thus, the use of this proposed procedure of-
fers the same protection for environmental goals that are set forth 
by NEPA itself. 239 
238. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970), as amended by 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(2)(O)-(I) 
(Supp. 1976). 
239. The additional step of a master designated to approve or disapprove the 
agency's preliminary decision could be incorporated into the proposed procedure. 
However, both practical and statutory considerations militate against the use of a 
master in this context. First, the addition of a master to the process would cause un-
necessary delay and expense. See Adventures in Good Eating, Inc. v. Best Places 
to Eat, Inc., 131 F.2d 809, 815 (7th Cir. 1942). The master commonly must follow 
normal adversary procedures and, therefore, his proceedings would tend to be a mere 
duplication of a trial. See Developments, supra note 205, at 1067-68. Second, be-
cause the parties must be allowed the right to appeal the master's finding to the court, 
which would retain jurisdiction, the master's decision would not be a final resolution 
of any issues. 
Finally, it is possible that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure preclude the use 
of a master to approve or disapprove preliminary agency decisions. Rule 53 (b) 
states that "save in matters of account and of difficult computation of damages, a 
reference [to a master] shall be made only upon a showing that some exceptional 
circumstance requires it." This rule has been narrowly interpreted. See La Buy v. 
Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957) (court congestion, length of trial, and com-
plexity of issues are not exceptional circumstances that warrant reference to a 
master). Thus, rule 53 probably does not permit the use of a master in applying 
the type of court injunction proposed by this Note. See Developments, supra note 
205, at 1068. 
